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For years, the preemption doctrine and the anticommandeering doc-
trine lived in an uneasy tension, with each threatening to consume the other.
On the one hand, preemption permits Congress to insist that state law give
way to congressional demands.  On the other hand, the anticommandeering
doctrine prohibits Congress from commandeering state legislatures or state
executives.  Without some way to establish a boundary between the two,
preemption could swallow the anticommandeering doctrine by allowing Con-
gress to control state law.  Alternatively, absent some boundary, anticom-
mandeering could swallow preemption by empowering states to refuse to be
governed by the commands of federal law.  Either the autonomy of the states
or the supremacy of federal law would have to go.
The conventional way to draw the boundary between permissible pre-
emption and unconstitutional commandeering had been to distinguish
between Congress telling the states what they couldn’t do and Congress tell-
ing the states what they had to do.  A negative command was permissible
preemption, while an affirmative command was impermissible
commandeering.
This distinction was deeply unsatisfying.  It is not hard to rewrite a posi-
tive command and make it negative in form.  If that’s all it took to turn
unconstitutional commandeering into permissible preemption, the anticom-
mandeering doctrine could be evaded at will.
The problem was posed in stark form by the Professional and Amateur
Sports Protection Act (PASPA), a statute that made it unlawful for states to
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authorize sports gambling.1  When litigation arose about the constitutionality
of PASPA, it was obvious that the anticommandeering doctrine would bar
Congress from requiring states to prohibit sports gambling.  But if Congress
could effectively require states to prohibit sports gambling by instead insist-
ing that states not authorize sports gambling, the anticommandeering doc-
trine would be a dead letter.  On the other hand, if Congress were barred by
the Constitution from telling the states what they couldn’t do, it seemed that
preemption would be a dead letter.  Rather than risk federal supremacy, the
lower courts viewed PASPA as preemption, permissibly telling the states what
they couldn’t do.2
For the challenge to PASPA to prevail in the Supreme Court, the Justices
had to be convinced not only that distinguishing between negative prohibi-
tions and affirmative commands was the wrong way to separate permissible
preemption from unconstitutional commandeering, but also that there was a
better and more principled way to separate permissible preemption from
unconstitutional commandeering.
And that’s exactly what happened.  The Supreme Court, in an opinion
written by Justice Alito, rejected the distinction between affirmative com-
mands and negative prohibitions as “empty.”3  Instead, it held that the right
distinction is between federal laws that regulate the people directly (and
accordingly can permissibly preempt state law) and federal laws that regulate
the state’s regulation of the people (and are therefore unconstitutional
attempts at commandeering).4
Strikingly, seven Justices—including Justices Breyer and Kagan—explic-
itly agreed with this understanding of the Constitution.  Even more strikingly,
no Justice expressed any different understanding of the Constitution.
Although Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor dissented on severability grounds,
they did not express any disagreement with the Court’s constitutional analy-
sis.  (Justice Breyer also dissented on severability grounds, but expressly
agreed with the Court’s constitutional analysis.)5
Other federalism decisions have produced closer votes, strong dissents,
and adherence to dissenting views in subsequent cases—rather than accept-
ance as a matter of precedent.  Why the difference here?
Perhaps a more principled distinction between preemption and com-
mandeering helped make the anticommandeering doctrine more accept-
able.  Perhaps greater focus on the reasons for the Constitutional
Convention’s decision in favor of a federal government acting directly on
individuals helped make the anticommandeering doctrine more persuasive.
1 28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2018).
2 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 230 (3d Cir. 2013)
(“When Congress passes a law that operates via the Supremacy Clause to invalidate con-
trary state laws, it is not telling the states what to do, it is barring them from doing some-
thing they want to do.”).
3 Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1478 (2018).
4 Id. at 1478–79.
5 See id. at 1489–90 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Perhaps the changing political valence of the anticommandeering doctrine
helped demonstrate its value.  And perhaps the majority’s willingness to leave
some things unsaid also helped move the Court toward consensus.
Whatever the cause, the anticommandeering doctrine emerged from its
encounter with PASPA stronger, more principled, and with broader—per-
haps unanimous—support on the Supreme Court.
Part I discusses the conventional understanding and critique of the dis-
tinction between preemption and commandeering.  Part II describes the dif-
ficulties that this conventional understanding and critique presented for the
constitutional challenge to PASPA.  Part III explains the more principled way
to distinguish between preemption and commandeering adopted by the
Supreme Court in Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n.  Part IV explores
possible reasons why no Justice offered any competing views of this constitu-
tional issue.  Part V critically evaluates the implications of Murphy across a
wide range of areas including state taxation, gun control, and immigration.
I. THE CONVENTIONAL UNDERSTANDING AND CRITIQUE
Preemption has conventionally been categorized as consisting of three
types: express preemption, field preemption, and conflict preemption, with
the latter two viewed as forms of implied preemption.6  A common way for
Congress to phrase an express preemption provision is as a prohibition on
states establishing or keeping in effect certain kinds of state law.
For example, the National Traffic and Motor Safety Act of 1966 provides
that “no State . . . shall have any authority either to establish, or to continue
in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equip-
ment any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of
such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to the Federal stan-
dard.”7  The Medical Device Amendments Act of 1976 provides that “no State
. . . may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device intended for
human use any requirement—(1) which is different from, or in addition to,
any requirement applicable under this chapter to the device, and (2) which
relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device.”8  And the Federal Boat
6 See, e.g., Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (noting that
“[p]re-emption may be either expressed or implied,” and that there are “at least two types
of implied pre-emption: field pre-emption . . . and conflict pre-emption”); Crosby v. Nat’l
Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 n.6 (2000) (noting that the three categories “are
not ‘rigidly distinct’” (quoting English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 n.5 (1990))).  It is
far from clear that this taxonomy does more good than harm, even in its treatment of
“field” and “conflict” preemption as inherently “implied.”  Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA.
L. REV. 225, 262–63 (2000) (“If Congress has the constitutional power to occupy a particu-
lar field, a federal statute may do so either expressly or by implication; the statute may
contain an express preemption clause to that effect, or it may simply imply such a
clause. . . .  The same goes for what the Court calls ‘conflict’ preemption . . . .”).
7 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1988) (repealed 1994); see Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529
U.S. 861, 867 (2000).
8 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2018); see Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 486 (1996).
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Safety Act of 1971 provides that “a State . . . may not establish, continue in
effect, or enforce a law or regulation establishing a recreational vessel or asso-
ciated equipment performance or other safety standard or imposing a
requirement for associated equipment . . . that is not identical to a regulation
prescribed” by the federal standard.9
Other express preemptions provisions are quite similar but use the pas-
sive voice.  For example, the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969
provides that “[n]o requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health
shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promo-
tion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with
the provisions of this chapter.”10  And the Federal Meat Inspection Act pro-
vides that “[r]equirements . . . with respect to premises, facilities and opera-
tions of any establishment at which inspection is provided under [this law],
which are in addition to, or different than those made [under this law] may
not be imposed by any State.”11
Not all express preemption provisions are directed at the states in this
way,12 but such phrasing is common enough that it was easy to think of pre-
emption as a federal directive to states requiring that they not have or
enforce certain law.  And it was natural for the Supreme Court to say broadly,
“Congress has the power to pre-empt state law.  There is no doubt that Con-
gress may withdraw specified powers from the States by enacting a statute
containing an express pre-emption provision.”13
Viewing preemption as involving prohibitions imposed on states by Con-
gress became even more attractive once the modern anticommandeering
cases were decided.  In New York v. United States, the Court held that the take-
title provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of
1985 was unconstitutional because it “commandeer[ed] the legislative
processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a
federal regulatory program.”14  The Court relied heavily on the contrast
between the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution.  Under the Arti-
cles, Congress issued commands to the states.  This proved ineffective, lead-
9 46 U.S.C. § 4306 (2012); see Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 58–59
(2002).
10 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (2018); see Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 515
(1992).
11 21 U.S.C. § 678 (2018); see Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 530 n.17 (1977).
12 The express preemption provision of the Copyright Act, for example, is phrased in
terms of what rights a person is entitled to under state law.  17 U.S.C. § 301 (2018) (“[A]ll
legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general
scope of copyright . . . that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within
the subject matter of copyright . . . are governed exclusively by this title. . . .  [N]o person is
entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the common law or
statutes of any State.”).
13 Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012) (citations omitted).
14 505 U.S. 144, 176 (1992) (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).
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ing to the Constitution, which empowers Congress to act directly on
individuals.15
Five years later, in Printz v. United States, the Court held that the provi-
sion of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act that required local chief
law enforcement officers to conduct background checks was unconstitu-
tional.  It explained:
We held in New York that Congress cannot compel the States to enact or
enforce a federal regulatory program.  Today we hold that Congress cannot
circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the States’ officers directly.  The
Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to
address particular problems, nor command the States’ officers, or those of
their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory
program.16
Given that the statutes held unconstitutional in New York and Printz
imposed affirmative duties on state legislatures and executives, while numer-
ous express preemption statutes were phrased as prohibitions on state law-
making and law enforcement, it was common to describe the distinction
between unconstitutional commandeering and permissible preemption as
the difference between affirmative commands and negative prohibitions.
A number of prominent scholars characterized the distinction in these
terms.17  So, too, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
largely relied on this distinction in upholding federal statutes prohibiting
state and local laws that restricted state and local officials from communicat-
ing with immigration authorities.  It explained that “Congress has not com-
pelled state and local governments to enact or administer any federal
regulatory program.  Nor has it affirmatively conscripted states, localities, or
their employees into the federal government’s service.”18  The challenged
statutes “do not directly compel states or localities to require or prohibit any-
thing.  Rather, they prohibit state and local governmental entities or officials
only from directly restricting the voluntary exchange of immigration infor-
mation with the INS.”19
15 Id. at 163.
16 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); see also Transcript of Oral Argu-
ment at 51–52, Printz, 521 U.S. 898 (Nos. 95-1478, 95-1503) (“[I]t’s surprising how . . .
rarely [the federal government] tells a State you must do something. . . .  As opposed to . . .
that you shouldn’t do something under the Supremacy [Clause]” (Kennedy, J.)).
17 E.g., Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism: New York,
Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 89–94; Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and
Subordinancy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 1001, 1054 (1995); Mark Tushnet, Globalization and Federalism in a Post-Printz World, 36
TULSA L.J. 11, 28 (2000). But see Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States: A Rebuttal to Dr.
Greve, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 91, 93 (2005).
18 City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1999).
19 Id. (upholding 8 U.S.C. § 1373 and § 1644); see Note, States’ Commandeered Convic-
tions: Why States Should Get a Veto Over Crime-Based Deportation, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2322, 2327
(2019) (describing City of New York as drawing roughly the same distinction that Murphy
rejected); Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Rick Su & Rose Cuison Villazor, Anti-Sanctuary and
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Viewing the distinction between permissible preemption and unconstitu-
tional commandeering as the difference between affirmative commands and
negative prohibitions left the anticommandeering doctrine vulnerable.  Such
a distinction is unprincipled and completely manipulable, leading some to
argue that the anticommandeering doctrine should be rejected.20
In addition, simply because the Constitution empowered Congress to
regulate individuals directly does not mean that it eliminated the power of
Congress to issue commands to the states.  If one kind of power is insuffi-
cient, that’s a good reason to add a different kind of power, but it’s hardly a
reason to conclude that the preexisting power was eliminated.
As Justice Stevens put it:
Under the Articles of Confederation, the Federal Government had the
power to issue commands to the States.  See Arts. VIII, IX.  Because that
indirect exercise of federal power proved ineffective, the Framers of the
Constitution empowered the Federal Government to exercise legislative
authority directly over individuals within the States, even though that direct
authority constituted a greater intrusion on state sovereignty.  Nothing in
that history suggests that the Federal Government may not also impose its
will upon the several States as it did under the Articles.  The Constitution
enhanced, rather than diminished, the power of the Federal Government.21
II. CHALLENGING PASPA
The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act makes it “unlawful”
for “a governmental entity to . . . authorize by law” sports gambling.22  Under
the conventional understanding of the distinction between permissible pre-
emption and unconstitutional commandeering, this sounded like a negative
prohibition and therefore permissible preemption.  A challenge to PASPA,
Immigration Localism, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 837, 853 (2019) (describing Murphy as “the recent
expansion of the anticommandeering doctrine by the Supreme Court to cover not only
federal mandates for affirmative state or local action but also federal efforts to prohibit
states and localities from taking specific actions”); City of Chicago v. Sessions, 321 F. Supp.
3d 855, 869 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (referring to the “pre-Murphy command-versus-proscription
dichotomy”); New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 343 F. Supp. 3d 213, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“It
is clear that City of New York cannot survive the Supreme Court’s decision in Murphy.”),
rev’d and remanded, 951 F.3d 84, 113 (2d Cir. 2020) (acknowledging that “Murphy may well
have clarified that prohibitions as well as mandates can manifest impermissible comman-
deering” but upholding 8 U.S.C. § 1373 as applied to a federal funding requirement).
20 Adler & Kreimer, supra note 17, at 143 (concluding that “[t]here is simply no differ- R
ence . . . between permissible preemption and impermissible commandeering” and expres-
sing hope that the anticommandeering doctrine will soon be outgrown); Caminker, supra
note 17, at 1088–89 (concluding that the “Court’s antagonism towards . . . commandeering R
is driven by attitude, not analysis” and that the doctrine “disserves all concerned”);
Tushnet, supra note 17, at 40 (concluding that the distinction between commandeering R
and preemption is “difficult to sustain”).
21 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 210 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part).
22 28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2018).
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then, could not rely on the conventional distinction between permissible pre-
emption and unconstitutional commandeering.  Instead, it would have to
reject that conventional distinction.
Articulating reasons to reject that conventional distinction was straight-
forward: if a prohibition on authorization were treated as permissible pre-
emption, the anticommandeering doctrine would be eviscerated.  Congress
could simply reframe anything it wanted to require states to do as a prohibi-
tion.  A distinction between “Thou shalt” and “Thou shalt not” is easily cir-
cumvented, as even the Bible itself illustrates.  The famous prohibition in
Exodus—“Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour’s house, thou shalt not covet
thy neighbour’s wife, nor his manservant, nor his maidservant, nor his ox,
nor his ass, nor any thing that is thy neighbour’s”— is rephrased in the Bible
itself as a positive command: “Let your conversation be without covetousness;
and be content with such things as ye have . . . .”23
States could be required to take title to radioactive waste by prohibiting
states from authorizing anyone but the state to own and possess radioactive
waste.  States could be required to run background checks by prohibiting
states from authorizing anyone to carry a gun without local law enforcement
first completing background checks.  States could be required to enact a fifty-
five-mile-per-hour speed limit by prohibiting states from authorizing anyone
to drive more than fifty-five miles per hour.  States could be required to enact
a fifteen dollar minimum wage by prohibiting states from authorizing anyone
to employ another unless the employee is paid a minimum of fifteen dollars
per hour.  And so on.
But there was a big problem.
By rejecting the conventional distinction between permissible negative
prohibitions and unconstitutional affirmative commands, the challengers
echoed and embraced the critics of the anticommandeering doctrine.  Yet if
the critics were right that the conventional distinction was unprincipled and
manipulable, weren’t they also right the anticommandeering doctrine should
be rejected?  Challenging PASPA could lead to the death of the very anticom-
mandeering doctrine the challengers relied on as the basis of their
challenge.
To avert this result, the challengers could point to a much earlier case
that the New York Court had relied upon to show that the anticommandeer-
ing was not an “innovation.”  That 1911 case, Coyle v. Smith, was cited in New
York for the proposition that “[w]hile Congress has substantial powers to gov-
ern the Nation directly, including in areas of intimate concern to the States,
the Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the
ability to require the States to govern according to Congress’ instructions.”24
Coyle involved a 1906 federal statute that admitted Oklahoma to the Union
but barred Oklahoma from moving its capital from the city of Guthrie prior
to 1913.  The equal-footing doctrine—the principle that newly admitted
23 Compare Exodus 20:17 (King James), with Hebrews 13:5 (King James).
24 New York, 505 U.S. at 162 (citing Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 565 (1911)).
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states stand on an equal footing with all others—was the immediate ground
of decision.  But the premise for applying that doctrine was a firm assertion:
“That one of the original thirteen states could now be shorn of such powers
by an act of Congress would not be for a moment entertained.”25
Although Congress issued a negative prohibition, telling Oklahoma what
it could not do, the Supreme Court held that prohibition unconstitutional.
It did not matter that Oklahoma was told that it could not move its capital
from Guthrie, rather than that it had to have its capital at Guthrie.  The nega-
tive prohibition was unconstitutional.  And the New York Court treated that
holding in Coyle as proof that the anticommandeering doctrine was no
innovation.
But that then led to another big problem: if the anticommandeering
doctrine not only prevents Congress from issuing positive commands to the
states, but also prevents Congress from issuing negative commands to the
states, what would happen to preemption?  A host of preemption statutes tell
states what they have no authority to do.  If the choice was between under-
mining preemption or adhering to a dubious distinction, the odds are good
that the distinction would survive, with Coyle limited to federal laws that
threatened the “separate and independent existence” of the states.26
A better way to distinguish between permissible preemption and uncon-
stitutional commandeering was required.  And that required a return to first
principles.
III. A BETTER WAY
A central flaw in the Articles of Confederation was the reliance on a
national power of issuing commands to the states.27  As James Madison put it
at the Convention, “The practicability of making laws, with coercive sanc-
tions, for the States as political bodies, had been exploded on all hands.”28
Madison and Hamilton made the same point during the ratification debates,
explaining that “a sovereignty over sovereigns, a government over govern-
ments, a legislation for communities, as contradistinguished from individu-
als, as it is a solecism in theory, so in practice it is subversive of the order and
ends of civil polity.”29
25 Coyle, 221 U.S. at 565.
26 New York, 505 U.S. at 204 (White, J., concurring in part) (first citing Lane County v.
Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1869); and then citing Coyle, 221 U.S. at 580).  This was
the path taken by the Court of Appeals in the first round of litigation challenging PASPA.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 230 (3d Cir. 2013) (“When
Congress passes a law that operates via the Supremacy Clause to invalidate contrary state
laws, it is not telling the states what to do, it is barring them from doing something they
want to do.”).
27 See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, arts. VIII, IX.
28 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 9 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
[hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS].
29 THE FEDERALIST NO. 20, at 138 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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The Constitution repudiated the Articles of Confederation by empower-
ing the national government to regulate the people directly.  This central
principle is reflected in the various enumerated powers given to Congress in
Article I and reflects the overall structure of the Constitution.  The Com-
merce Clause is a prominent example.  It provides that Congress shall have
power to regulate commerce among the several states.30  By its terms, the
Commerce Clause “authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce
directly; it does not authorize Congress to regulate state governments’ regula-
tion of interstate commerce.”31  Congress has the power to lay and collect
taxes, but not the power to requisition funds from the states and command
them to impose taxes.32  Similarly, Congress has the power to provide for the
common defense and general welfare of the United States, but no power to
command the states to spend state money as Congress demands.33
The decision to create a national government acting directly on the peo-
ple was profound, for it meant that the Constitution had to be made in the
name of the people rather than the states, and had to be ratified by the peo-
ple, assembled in convention, rather than by the state legislatures.34  As Chief
Justice Marshall put it, “The government of the Union . . . is, emphatically,
and truly, a government of the people.  In form and in substance it emanates
from them.  Its powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly
on them.”35  The Constitution thus “created a legal system unprecedented in
form and design, establishing two orders of government, each with its own
direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual rights and obliga-
tions to the people who sustain it and are governed by it.”36
The Framers did seriously consider—at Madison’s repeated insistence—
giving Congress the additional power “to negative all laws passed by the sev-
eral States, contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature the arti-
cles of Union.”37  On May 31, 1787, the Committee of the Whole approved
30 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce
. . . among the several States . . . .”).
31 New York, 505 U.S. at 166.
32 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have power To lay and collect
Taxes . . . .”); see, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 148 (2016) (“The consensus among delegates for empower-
ing Congress to levy taxes—rather than simply requisition funds—which would obviate the
need for a power to coerce states, was so strong that little discussion was devoted to the
subject.”).
33 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 576–77 (2012) (Rob-
erts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.) (noting that because Spending Clause legislation is
in the nature of a contract, the “legitimacy of Congress’s exercise of the spending power”
depends on “whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the ‘con-
tract’” (first quoting Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 186 (2002); and then quoting Pen-
nhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981))).
34 See U.S. CONST. pmbl., art. VII.
35 M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 404–05 (1819).
36 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
37 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 28, at 21.
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this proposal without debate.38  In July, however, the delegates reversed their
approval of the congressional veto because the negative would be “terrible to
the States,” “unnecessary,” and “improper.”39
A nation in which two sovereign governments are both empowered to
operate directly on the people needs a rule of priority to resolve conflicts
between the two sets of laws.  The traditional default rule would have been
that the later statute prevailed.40  That was unacceptable because it would
have failed to overcome the vices of the Articles—at least absent Madison’s
beloved but rejected veto over state legislation.
Instead, the Framers adopted the Supremacy Clause.41  The Supremacy
Clause is not a grant of power to Congress.  It is, instead, a rule of priority
establishing that a valid federal law displaces contrary state law.42  It
is critically important to note the Supremacy Clause itself does not authorize
Congress to preempt state laws [because it] only prescribed a constitutional
choice-of-law rule . . . .  If the Clause were meant to be an affirmative grant of
congressional power, it would likely reside in the metropolis of congres-
sional power, Article I, Section 8, rather than in the suburbs of Article VI.43
As a choice-of-law rule, the Supremacy Clause and its “doctrinal descendent
preemption” have “no substantive component” and are not a power or means
of exercising congressional power.44
Once it is understood that preemption is not a power of the national
government, but only the byproduct of the rule of priority established by the
Supremacy Clause, a better way to understand the distinction between per-
missible preemption and unconstitutional commandeering emerges: pre-
emption can occur only when Congress establishes a valid federal rule
governing the people, pursuant to some other constitutionally enumerated
38 Id. at 61.
39 2 id. at 27; see Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 794 (1982)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (tracing this history).
40 See Nelson, supra note 6, at 237 (2000) (citing authorities from Blackstone to Feder-
alist 78).
41 See, e.g., JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUTION 81–82, 171–77 (1996).
42 See Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 324–25 (2015) (describ-
ing the Supremacy Clause as a “rule of decision” that “instructs courts what to do when
state and federal law clash”); Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2262
(2020) (stating that the Supremacy Clause “‘creates a rule of decision’ directing state
courts that they ‘must not give effect to state laws that conflict with federal law’” (quoting
Armstrong, 575 U.S. at 324)).
43 Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2088 (2000).
44 Allison H. Eid, Preemption and the Federalism Five, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 6–8 (2005).
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power.45  The federal rule preempts because it displaces state law and
replaces the state law with a valid federal rule.46
The federal law stands on its own bottom, can be enforced without
regard to state law, and requires nothing of state law or state action other
than to give way to superior federal law.47  The people must obey that federal
law.  And the courts, both state and federal, must decide cases in accordance
with that federal law, “any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.”48  But unless there is a federal rule directly
governing the people’s conduct, there is no predicate for preemption.
If the national government directly regulates the people, and requires a
state to stand aside, that is permissible preemption.49  However, if the
national government attempts to require a state to govern according to Con-
gress’s instructions by using a state against its will to regulate its people, that
is impermissible commandeering.
45 See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824) (describing the com-
merce power as “the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is
to be governed”).
The federal government may also insist that it, its instrumentalities, its officers, and its
transactions be governed by federal law rather than state law. See, e.g., Dawson v. Steager,
139 S. Ct. 698, 702 (2019); Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 501 (1988);
Clearfield Tr. Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943); M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 360–62 (1819).  Where rights and obligations of private parties are
involved, this is easily viewed as a form of preemption.  Where rights and obligations of
private parties are not involved, it is more commonly described as intergovernmental
immunity.
46 Nelson, supra note 6, at 250–52. See Petersburg Cellular P’ship v. Bd. of Superiors R
of Nottoway Cnty., 205 F.3d 688, 703 (4th Cir. 2000) (Niemeyer, J.) (“Congress may govern
directly the people . . . .  But it may not govern the states for the purpose of indirectly
exacting its will on the people.  Preemption involves the direct federal governance of the
people in a way that supersedes concurrent state governance of the same people, not a
federal usurpation of state government . . . for federal ends.” (emphasis omitted) (first
citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 710 (1999); then citing Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898, 919–20 (1997); and then citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162
(1992))).
47 See Nelson, supra note 6, at 252 (“[T]he Supremacy Clause says that courts must R
apply all valid rules of federal law.  To the extent that applying state law would keep them
from doing so, the Supremacy Clause requires courts to disregard the state rule and follow
the federal one.”); Eid, supra note 44, at 38 (noting that preemption is the “doctrinal
descendant of the Supremacy Clause,” which “acts as a conflict-of-laws principle that
instructs courts to apply federal law in the event of a conflict with state law”).
48 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
49 A police officer commandeers a car whether he gets in the passenger seat and
orders the driver to “follow that car!” or pulls the driver out of the car and drives it him-
self—with or without issuing an affirmative command, the officer is using the car for his
own ends, not the driver’s.  By contrast, a police officer does not commandeer anything if
he stays in his own patrol car, turns on the siren, and affirmatively commands drivers block-
ing his way to move to the side. Cf. Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1114–15
(1993).
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Permissible preemption is predicated on Congress telling the people
what they can’t do, what they must do, or what they may do.  Most laws are
some combination of these requirements.
Some laws look like prohibitions.  For example, federal law prohibits
paying less than a minimum wage,50 employing children,51 or distributing
(even possessing) marijuana.52
Some laws look like regulations.  For example, federal law regulates the
production of medical devices,53 the generation of nuclear power,54 and the
sale of securities.55
Some laws look like requirements.  For example, federal law requires
people to file income tax returns,56 to pay income taxes,57 to include head-
lights on cars,58 to print warnings on cigarettes,59 and to provide disclosures
before extending credit.60
But no prohibition prohibits everything, and all regulations prohibit
something.  The prohibition on paying less than a minimum wage does not
apply to adequately tipped employees,61 the bar on child labor does not
apply to a broad range of agricultural work,62 and even the ban on distribut-
ing marijuana does not apply to certain preapproved research studies.63  The
laws governing medical devices,64 nuclear power,65 and securities66 set out
both what the people can’t do, and what they may do.
Plus, requirements are almost always conditional: include headlights if
you manufacture a car; print warnings if you sell cigarettes; provide disclo-
50 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2018); see United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 117 (1941).
51 29 U.S.C. § 212 (2018); see Darby, 312 U.S. at 116 (overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart,
247 U.S. 251 (1918)).
52 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841(a), 844 (2018); see Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005)
(upholding federal prohibition of marijuana possession and distribution).
53 See, e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 316 (2008) (describing the Medical
Device Amendments of 1976 as “impos[ing] a regime of detailed federal oversight”).
54 Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2023 (2018); see Va. Uranium v. Warren, 139
S. Ct. 1894, 1902 (2019).
55 E.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j, 77q (2018); see Lorenzo v. SEC, 139 S. Ct. 1094, 1100 (2019).
56 26 U.S.C. §§ 7203, 6012 (2018).
57 Id. § 1.
58 49 U.S.C. § 30111 (2012); 49 C.F.R. § 571.108 (2019).
59 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2018); see Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77–78 (2008).
60 Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1693 (2018); see Wolfington v.
Reconstructive Orth. Assocs., 935 F.3d 187, 196 (3d Cir. 2019).
61 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(m)(2)(A), 206(a) (2018).
62 Id. § 213(c)(1).
63 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 14 (2005) (first citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 823(f), 841(a)(1),
844(a) (2018); and then citing United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S.
483, 490 (2001)).
64 E.g., 21 U.S.C. § 353 (2018).
65 E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2131 (2012).
66 E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2018).
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sures if you extend credit.  Even the laws requiring the filing of tax returns
and paying taxes are conditioned on earning enough income.67
If a federal rule operates directly on the people by telling them what
they can’t do, what they must do, what they may do, or some combination of
these, it can act as a predicate for preemption.
To the extent a federal rule tells the people what they can’t do, states
cannot immunize people from the obligation to obey federal law—as they
could have under the traditional last-in-time rule.  But the states need not
(and in some instances, may not) enact or maintain similar prohibitions as a
matter of state law.
To the extent that a federal rule tells the people what they must do,
states cannot immunize people from the obligation to obey federal law.  But
the states need not (and in some instances, may not) enact or maintain simi-
lar requirements as a matter of state law.
To the extent that a federal rule tells the people what they may do, an
important additional question must be answered: Is the federal determina-
tion that the people may do something merely a determination that the fed-
eral government has no objection to that conduct?  Or is it a federal
determination that the people have a right to engage in that conduct?  If the
former, there is merely a withholding of a federal prohibition, and states are
free to impose their own prohibitions and limitations on that conduct.  But if
the latter, states may not prevent the people from exercising that federal
right.68
The famous case of Gibbons v. Ogden provides an early example of the
latter, interpreting a federal law permitting certain vessels to engage in the
coasting trade as conferring a right to engage in that trade.69
67 26 U.S.C. §§ 1, 63, 6012.
68 In Hohfeldian terms, one might say that the question is whether federal law has
merely created a federal “privilege” in those allowed to engage in that conduct, with a
correlative federal “no-right” in the state to stop that conduct or has gone further and
created a federal “right” to engage in that conduct, with a correlative federal “duty” of the
state to refrain from interfering with that conduct. See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld,
Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913);
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917).
69 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 212 (1824) (“To the Court it seems very clear, that the whole
act on the subject of the coasting trade, according to those principles which govern the
construction of statutes, implies, unequivocally, an authority to licensed vessels to carry on
the coasting trade.”).  The Court toyed with the idea that, in the area subject to federal
authority under the Commerce Clause, all federal rules that allow conduct create federal
rights to engage in that conduct. Id. at 209 (noting that there is “great force” to the argu-
ment that “as the word ‘to regulate’ implies in its nature, full power over the thing to be
regulated, it excludes, necessarily, the action of all others that would perform the same
operation on the same thing.  That regulation is designed for the entire result, applying to
those parts which remain as they were, as well as to those which are altered.  It produces a
uniform whole, which is as much disturbed and deranged by changing what the regulating
power designs to leave untouched, as that on which it has operated.”).  Again, in
Hohfeldian terms, the Court toyed with idea that the jural relationship of privilege/no-
right was not available.  That idea never fully took root (although a truncated version
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It might be thought that federal deregulatory statutes preempt without
establishing a federal rule.  But a moment’s analysis reveals this to be in
error.  When Congress chooses to deregulate an area, such as the routes and
prices of airlines and trucks, it does establish a federal rule telling the people
what they may do, in the strong sense of telling the people what they have a
right to do.  The federal rule is that the people have a federal right to engage
freely in that activity (as delimited by federal law).70  Of course, Congress
could deregulate in a much weaker sense, simply by removing an existing
federal regulation, without creating a right to engage in that conduct.  Imag-
ine, for example, if Congress were to remove marijuana from the schedule of
controlled substances: it would not thereby create a federal right to possess
or distribute marijuana.71
This better way of understanding the distinction between permissible
preemption and unconstitutional commandeering was adopted by seven
members of the Supreme Court, with no Justice expressing disagreement
with it.72
In an opinion written by Justice Alito, the Court observed that the
defenders of PASPA argued that “the laws challenged in New York and Printz
‘told states what they must do instead of what they must not do,’ [and] that
commandeering occurs ‘only when Congress goes beyond precluding state
action and affirmatively commands it.’”73  The Court flatly rejected this con-
ventional understanding: “This distinction is empty.  It was a matter of hap-
penstance that the laws challenged in New York and Printz commanded
‘affirmative’ action as opposed to imposing a prohibition.  The basic princi-
ple—that Congress cannot issue direct orders to state legislatures—applies in
either event.”74
Having rejected the conventional understanding, it adopted the better
understanding described above.  First, the Court noted that “[p]reemption is
based on the Supremacy Clause, and that Clause is not an independent grant
of legislative power to Congress.  Instead, it simply provides ‘a rule of deci-
became the negative (or dormant) Commerce Clause doctrine) and would be completely
untenable under modern views of the scope of the Commerce Clause.
70 See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378 (1992) (quoting 49
U.S.C. app. § 1302(a)(4) (1988)); Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364, 367
(2008) (noting that Congress had chosen “maximum reliance on competitive market
forces” (quoting Morales, 504 U.S. at 378)).
71 See Marijuana Justice Act of 2019, S. 597, 116th Cong. (2019) (recognizing implicitly
that descheduling marijuana would leave states free to regulate it).
72 Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Sotomayor, assumed arguendo that the chal-
lenged portions of PASPA were unconstitutional and dissented on severability grounds.
Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1489 (2018) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
73 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1478 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 19, Murphy, 138 S. Ct.
1461 (Nos. 16-476, 16-477), 2017 WL 4684747, at *19).
74 Id.
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sion’” that “federal law is supreme in case of a conflict with state law.”75  As a
result, for a federal law to preempt state law, there has to be a basis for it
other than the Supremacy Clause.  And, because the Constitution empowers
Congress to regulate individuals, not states, for a federal law to be valid, it
“must be best read as one that regulates private actors.”76
Rather than get bogged down in the frequently unhelpful task of classify-
ing preemption as “conflict,” “express,” or “field,” the Court cut through
their differences to the fundamental similarity at their core: “[A]ll of them
work in the same way: Congress enacts a law that imposes restrictions or con-
fers rights on private actors; a state law confers rights or imposes restrictions
that conflict with the federal law; and therefore the federal law takes prece-
dence and the state law is preempted.”77
This key insight not only adopts the better understanding of the differ-
ence between permissible preemption and unconstitutional commandeering
but also clarifies the nature of preemption more generally.  A deregulatory
statute works the same way; “[i]t confers on private entities . . . a federal right
to engage in certain conduct subject only to certain (federal) constraints.”78
Turning to the particular provision at issue in Murphy, the Court
explained:
Once this is understood, it is clear that the PASPA provision prohibiting
state authorization of sports gambling is not a preemption provision because
there is no way in which this provision can be understood as a regulation of
private actors.  It certainly does not confer any federal rights on private
actors interested in conducting sports gambling operations.  (It does not
give them a federal right to engage in sports gambling.)  Nor does it impose
any federal restrictions on private actors.  If a private citizen or company
started a sports gambling operation, either with or without state authoriza-
tion, § 3702(1) would not be violated and would not provide any ground for
a civil action by the Attorney General or any other party.  Thus, there is
simply no way to understand the provision prohibiting state authorization as
anything other than a direct command to the States.  And that is exactly
what the anticommandeering rule does not allow.79
The Court also clarified the basis for its decision in Reno v. Condon,
which upheld a federal law restricting the disclosure and dissemination of
personal information provided in applications for driver’s licenses.80  That
law, the Driver Privacy Protection Act, did not violate the anticommandeer-
ing doctrine because it “applied equally to state and private actors” and “did
75 Id. at 1479 (quoting Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1383
(2015)).
76 Id.
77 Id. at 1480.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 1481.  The Court recognized “that a closely related provision of PASPA,
§ 3702(2), does restrict private conduct, but that is not the provision challenged by petition-
ers,” and in a later part of the opinion (not joined by Justice Breyer), decided “whether
§ 3702(2) is severable from the provision directly at issue in these cases.” Id.
80 528 U.S. 141, 143 (2000).
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not regulate the States’ sovereign authority to ‘regulate their own citi-
zens.’”81  These two ideas work together: if a law applies equally to state and
private actors, it must be because the law applies to activity that the state
undertakes in some role other than its role as sovereign, such as in its role as
market participant.  “The anticommandeering doctrine does not apply when
Congress evenhandedly regulates an activity in which both States and private
actors engage.”82  Private actors do not act as sovereign regulators, but states
often act as market participants: buying and selling goods and services, bor-
rowing money, employing labor.
IV. EXPLAINING THE ABSENCE OF ANY COMPETING VIEW
OF THE CONSTITUTION
Justices Breyer and Kagan joined Justice Alito’s opinion on this constitu-
tional issue.  Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor did not join but did not offer
any competing view on this constitutional issue.  Instead, they simply
assumed arguendo that the challenged provision was unconstitutional, and
dissented “from the Court’s determination to destroy PASPA rather than sal-
vage the statute,” contending that the challenged provision should be sev-
ered from the rest of the statute which could still be enforced.83
This approach stands in stark contrast to other federalism decisions,
including prior anticommandeering cases, Commerce Clause cases, and sov-
ereign immunity cases.84
Anticommandeering: New York was a 6–3 decision,85 and Printz was 5–4,
with Justice Souter switching from majority in New York to dissent in Printz—
no dissenter (or his replacement) switched the other way.86  Justice Stevens
dissented in both, and Justices Ginsburg and Breyer (replacing Justices White
and Blackmun) dissented in Printz, as their predecessors had dissented in
New York.
Commerce Clause: Lopez was a 5–4 decision,87 as was Morrison.88  Not only
did the Lopez dissenters continue to dissent in Morrison, but they indicated
that they would continue to do so: “All of this convinces me that today’s ebb
of the commerce power rests on error, and at the same time leads me to
81 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1479 (quoting Reno, 528 U.S. at 151).
82 Id. at 1478.
83 Id. 1489–90 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  “Thus no justice actually disagreed with the
majority’s core holding.”  Mark Brnovich, Betting on Federalism: Murphy v. NCAA and the
Future of Sports Gambling, 2017–2018 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 247, 254; cf. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at
1482 n.30 (“The dissent apparently disagrees with our holding that the provisions forbid-
ding state authorization and licensing violate the anticommandeering principle, but it pro-
vides no explanation for its position.”).
84 See Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 164
(2004) (“[T]he Five and the Four seem ‘dug in’ to their respective positions, to the point
that the Four refuse even to accept the stare decisis force of their past defeats.”).
85 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 147 (1992).
86 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 900–01 (1997).
87 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 550 (1995).
88 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 600 (2000).
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doubt that the majority’s view will prove to be enduring law.”89 NFIB v. Sebe-
lius, too, was a 5–4 decision on the Commerce Clause issue (as well as on the
Spending Clause issue involving the so-called individual mandate).90
Sovereign immunity, including Congressional abrogation power: Numerous sov-
ereign immunity decisions have been 5–4, with dissenters repeatedly refusing
to acquiesce.  Examples include Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,91 Alden v.
Maine,92 Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,93Federal Maritime Commission v. South
Carolina State Ports Authority,94 Central Virginia Community College v. Katz,95
Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt.96  As Justice Breyer put it for four
dissenting Justices in Federal Maritime Commission, “I do not simply reiterate
the dissenting views set forth in many of the Court’s recent sovereign immu-
nity decisions.  For even were I to believe that those decisions properly stated
the law—which I do not—I still could not accept the Court’s conclusion
here.”97
Given this context, it is striking that Justices Breyer and Kagan joined
Justice Alito’s opinion regarding commandeering, and even more striking
that Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, while not joining that opinion, said
not a word contending that its understanding of preemption and comman-
deering was wrong.98
How can we explain this?
One possible explanation is that once a more principled distinction
between permissible preemption and impermissible commandeering was
articulated, Justices who were previously (or would otherwise be) opposed to
the anticommandeering doctrine found the doctrine more acceptable.  This
might be particularly true to the extent that the anticommandeering doc-
89 Id. at 654 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
90 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 524 (2012).  The Medicaid
expansion aspect of the NFIB decision might be viewed as a forerunner of Murphy, in that
Justices Breyer and Kagan joined that part of Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion.
91 517 U.S. 44, 46 (1996).
92 527 U.S. 706, 710 (1999).
93 528 U.S. 62, 65 (2000).
94 535 U.S. 743, 746 (2002).
95 546 U.S. 356, 358 (2006).
96 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1490 (2019) (overruling Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979)).
97 Federal Maritime Commission, 535 U.S. at 772 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omit-
ted).  Two terms after Murphy, Justice Breyer concurred in a judgment based on a state’s
sovereign immunity and stated, “recognizing that my longstanding view has not carried the
day, and that the Court’s decision in Florida Prepaid controls this case, I concur in the
judgment.”  Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1009 (2020) (citing Fla. Prepaid Post. Edu.
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Savs. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999)). Florida Prepaid involved patent; Allen
involved copyright.
98 See Josh Blackman, Improper Commandeering, 21 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 959, 978–79
(2019) (“Justices Ginsburg and Breyer . . . joined the Printz dissent two decades earlier.
Yet, they now accepted—or at least declined to reject—a doctrine that Justice Stevens con-
cluded had no basis in the text or history of the Constitution.  Justice Kagan joined Murphy
without reservation.” (footnote omitted) (citing Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,
138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018)).
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trine was formulated by the Court in a way that no longer threatened to swal-
low up preemption (and risk federal supremacy).
But even if the anticommandeering doctrine seemed more principled
and less dangerous, that wouldn’t answer the fundamental critique articu-
lated by Justice Stevens in New York noted above:
Under the Articles of Confederation, the Federal Government had the
power to issue commands to the States.  See Arts. VIII, IX.  Because that
indirect exercise of federal power proved ineffective, the Framers of the
Constitution empowered the Federal Government to exercise legislative
authority directly over individuals within the States, even though that direct
authority constituted a greater intrusion on state sovereignty.  Nothing in
that history suggests that the Federal Government may not also impose its
will upon the several States as it did under the Articles.  The Constitution
enhanced, rather than diminished, the power of the Federal Government.99
Providing an answer to that critique could make the anticommandeer-
ing doctrine not only more principled and less dangerous, but also more
persuasive.  And there is an answer to that critique, an answer found in one
of the reasons why the Constitutional Convention opted for a national gov-
ernment operating directly on individuals.
One reason the Framers opted for national power operating directly on
individuals was that it would be more effective than one operating on the
states.  But that wasn’t the only reason.  They also concluded that making
national power operating on the states truly effective was dangerous.
The Constitutional Convention considered that one way to make the
national government more effective was to give the national government
coercive means of enforcing its demands on the states.  But it firmly rejected
that approach.
The choice made by the Convention is commonly described as a choice
in favor of the Virginia Plan, under which the national government would
operate on individuals, over the New Jersey Plan, under which the national
government would operate on states.100
Less frequently noted, however, is that under the original Virginia Plan,
the national government would have been given the power “to call forth the
force of the Union agst. any member of the Union failing to fulfill its duty
under the articles thereof.”101  Further discussion led Madison to realize that
99 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 210 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part); see also States’ Commandeered Convictions, supra note 19, at 2325 (referring to “the
debatable inference that by empowering the federal government to regulate individuals,
the Constitution implicitly rescinded its prior powers to regulate states as states”).
100 See New York, 505 U.S. at 164–65.
101 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 28, at 21 (notes of James Madison on May 29,
1787); see Bradford R. Clark, The Eleventh Amendment and the Nature of the Union, 123 HARV.
L. REV. 1817, 1844 (2010) (“Madison included power to regulate and coerce states in the
Virginia Plan.”); id. at 1841–42 (recounting a similar proposal by Madison in 1781 to
amend the Articles of Confederation); see also Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark,
The International Law Origins of American Federalism, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 835, 875, 917–23
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such a coercive constitutional provision risked civil war.  The provision was
postponed without dissent.102
The New Jersey Plan had a similar provision,103 which Hamilton criti-
cized as one that would not only lead to civil war, but to foreign intervention
and dissolution of the Union.104
That is, both the Virginia Plan and the New Jersey plan had provisions
that would empower enforcement against the states.  The Framers rejected
this power not only by rejecting the New Jersey plan, but also by eliminating
it from the Virginia Plan due to a fear of civil war and foreign intervention.
Madison had “arrived in Philadelphia favoring legislative power over states
and the introduction of coercive power to ensure their compliance with fed-
eral commands,” but “left the Convention in favor of a central government
with legislative power over individuals rather than states, and opposed to
coercive power over states,” viewing “the Constitution’s novel approach as the
only viable plan of government.”105
From today’s perspective, it can be hard to grasp the seriousness of this
fear.106  Today, the United States is a global superpower, having survived a
civil war and prevailed in two world wars, sitting astride a continent from sea
to shining sea and beyond.  But at the Framing of the Constitution, the
United States was a weak, new nation, surrounded by territory controlled by
European powers—powers that would be happy to gobble up bites of the new
nation if the states turned against each other.
The choice to empower the national government to act directly on indi-
viduals was made not only as a way to make the national government more
(2020) (describing Madison’s early proposal to authorize Congress to commandeer the
states and its later rejection). The Sixth Resolution read:
Resolved that each branch ought to possess the right of originating Acts; that the
National Legislature ought to be impowered to enjoy the Legislative Rights vested
in Congress by the Confederation & moreover to legislate in all cases to which the
separate States are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States
may be interrupted by the exercise of individual Legislation; to negative all laws
passed by the several States, contravening in the opinion of the National Legisla-
ture the articles of Union; and to call forth the force of the Union agst. any mem-
ber of the Union failing to fulfill its duty under the articles thereof.
1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 28, at 21.
102 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 28, at 54 (notes of James Madison on May 31,
1787).
103 Id. at 245 (June 15, 1787).
104 Id. at 285 (June 18, 1787); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 20, supra note 29, at 138
(James Madison) (“[A] sovereignty over sovereigns, a government over governments, a
legislation for communities, as contradistinguished from individuals, as it is a solecism in
theory, so in practice it is subversive of the order and ends of civil polity . . . .”).
105 Clark, supra note 101, at 1852–53.
106 Or perhaps not. See, e.g., Jelani Cobb, Why Trump, Facing Impeachment, Warns of Civil
War, NEW YORKER (Oct. 5, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/why-
trump-facing-impeachment-warns-of-civil-war; Tom O’Connor, Russian Official Cancels U.S.
Visit, Saying ‘Second American Civil War’ Is Underway, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 10, 2019), https://
www.newsweek.com/russia-cancel-visit-american-civil-war-1287282.
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efficient.  It was also part of a deliberate decision not to empower the
national government to make enforceable demands on the states in order to
avoid the risks of civil war and dismemberment that such a power would
create.107
Another factor that may have contributed to the absence of any chal-
lenge to the anticommandeering doctrine as articulated by Justice Alito is the
changing political valence of federalism.108  For many years, federalism was
associated with conservative political views at best, and white supremacy at
107 Some have argued that the persistence of arguments for requisitions rather than
federal taxation of the people demonstrates that the anticommandeering doctrine is
inconsistent with the original understanding of the Constitution. See Erik M. Jensen &
Jonathan L. Entin, Commandeering, the Tenth Amendment, and the Federal Requisition Power:
New York v. United States Revisited, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 355, 374 (1998).  A full originalist
defense of the anticommandeering doctrine is beyond the scope of this Article.  For discus-
sion, see Bellia & Clark, supra note 101, at 917–40 (arguing that the Constitution’s use of
the word “States,” in the context of background principles of international law, supports
the anticommandeering doctrine); Young, supra note 84, at 127 & n.624 (noting that the
“most persuasive justification arises not from the historical arguments . . . but rather from
its functional relation to the political safeguards of federalism,” because it “requires the
national government to internalize two kinds of costs,” political and administrative);
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy
Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 943–44 (1998) (criticizing
the reasoning of New York and Printz while endorsing their result, because “the entitlement
. . . simply allows nonfederal governments to extract a fair price for their services—an
entitlement already enjoyed by private persons and organizations when they deal with the
national government”). Compare Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Textualism and Federal-
ism: The Proper Textual Basis of the Supreme Court’s Tenth and Eleventh Amendment Decisions, 93
NW. U. L. REV. 819 (1999) (supporting anticommandeering doctrine on textualist and
originalist grounds), with Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L.
REV. 1957 (1993) (distinguishing between commandeering of legislatures and executives
on originalist grounds).
However, it is worth noting that the examples cited by Jensen and Entin all seem to
treat federal taxation of the people—not compulsion of the states—as the appropriate
response if states do not pay what is requisitioned.  That is, such requisitions seem to effec-
tively be requests for voluntary cooperation. Cf. Prakash, supra, at 2034 (noting that,
under the Articles of Confederation, “requisitions were really only supplications”).  Jensen
and Entin suggest that the Constitution gave the states a political choice, but not a legal
choice, to decline to pay requisitions.  Jensen & Entin, supra, at 376 n.92.  But none of
their examples contemplates the possibility of a judicially enforceable legal duty—which is
what is at stake in the anticommandeering cases.  Although the government in Printz took
the position that local law enforcement officers were not subject to criminal penalties for
failing to carry out the required background checks, it did envision judicial enforcement of
that duty by mandamus. See Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1511 n.19 (D. Mont.
1994), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, dismissed in part sub nom. Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d
1025 (9th Cir. 1995), rev’d sub nom. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); see also
Transcript of Oral Argument at 45, Printz, 521 U.S. 898 (No. 95-1478) (Solicitor General
Dellinger) (“[W]e do not take the position that it is voluntary.”).
108 See Zachary S. Price, Symmetric Constitutionalism: An Essay on Masterpiece Cakeshop
and the Post-Kennedy Supreme Court, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 1273, 1301 (2019) (“Back when federal-
ism was more generally perceived as a conservative cause, the most liberal justices dissented
from key anti-commandeering decisions. . . .  [T]hat view looks short-sighted; the contin-
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worst.109  But that has changed.  One major contributor has been the trajec-
tory of the gay rights movement, particularly regarding marriage—achieving
victory after victory at the state level well before (controversially) daring to
seek a federal victory—that made federalism look quite different.  And it was
both easy to see and highlighted in the briefing that the anticommandeering
doctrine could be used by states and localities that disagreed with federal
immigration and marijuana policies.110
To the extent that the anticommandeering doctrine in particular came
to be seen as a principle of constitutional structure that functions to protect a
range of political perspectives, it could be seen as either correct (Justices
Breyer and Kagan) or at least not so unacceptable as to be worth criticizing
unnecessarily (Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor).111  From a functional
approach, the virtues of the anticommandeering doctrine may have come
into sharper focus for some in the era of President Trump: imagine if the
President had (or could be given) command authority not only over the ICE
gency of the doctrine’s political valence in any given instance should have been apparent
even then.” (footnote omitted)).
109 See Ilya Somin, Making Federalism Great Again: How the Trump Administration’s Attack
on Sanctuary Cities Unintentionally Strengthened Judicial Protection for State Autonomy, 97 TEX. L.
REV. 1247, 1291 (2019) (“[L]ong-standing conventional wisdom [held] that federalism is a
disaster for racial and ethnic minority groups, while the growth of federal power was a
great benefit to them.”).
110 E.g., Brief for Petitioners at 29, Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 832 F.3d.
389 (3d Cir. 2016) (No. 16-476), 2017 WL 3774486, at *29 (“[I]n recent years, States
repeatedly have responded to the wishes of their citizens by enacting policies in areas
including medical marijuana, immigration, and surveillance that might be viewed as
‘unfriendly’ to those of the national government.”), rev’d sub nom Murphy v. Nat’l Col-
legiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018); Supplemental Brief Submitted by New Jersey
Thoroughbred Horsemen’s Association, Inc. in Response to Brief of the United States at
10–12, N.J. Thoroughbred Horsemen’s Ass’n v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, rev’d sub
nom. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (No. 16-477), 2017 WL 2459691, at *10–12 (discussing state
marijuana cases).  The briefing also made a point of citing supportive statements about the
anticommandeering doctrine from scholars who would be known (at least to Justices
Breyer and Kagan) as left of center. See Brief for the Petitioner, at 23–24, 28, N.J. Thorough-
bred Horsemen’s Ass’n, rev’d sub nom. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. 1461  (No. 16-477), 2017 WL
3774488, at *23–24, *28 (citing Akhil Reed Amar, Jack M. Balkin, Paul Brest, Erwin
Chemerinsky, Sanford Levinson, and Reva B. Siegel).
111 See Vikram D. Amar, “Clarifying” Murphy’s Law: Did Something Go Wrong in Reconciling
Commandeering and Conditional Preemption Doctrines?, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 299, 346 (“[I]t bears
mention also that Murphy represents the first case in which the Court has applied the
anticommandeering principle to strike down a federal law that was not associated with
progressive policies in the way environmental protection and gun control are, a fact that
might portend the durability of the doctrine.”); Price, supra note 108, at 1300 (“Murphy’s
strong reaffirmation of the anti-commandeering principle provides a textbook example of
bipartisan symmetry.”).  A similar recognition of the virtues of federalism may be at play in
Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020), where Justice Kagan wrote the Court’s opinion hold-
ing that Congress could not abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity under the copyright
clause.  Justice Sotomayor joined her opinion, and Justices Breyer and Ginsburg concurred
in the judgment.  Or Allen might be explained as bolstering stare decisis.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-1\NDL107.txt unknown Seq: 22  5-NOV-20 8:44
372 notre dame law review [vol. 96:1
agents, Custom and Border Patrol agents, and FBI agents, but also over every
police officer (state and local) in the country.112
In Printz, Justice Scalia worried about the erosion of presidential power
if Congress could bypass the President’s control and impress state officers
into enforcing federal law.113  But the far greater threat of tyranny would be
if the President could control not only the federal officers for which Con-
gress was willing to provide the funding, but also the entire network of state
and local police forces.114  Justice Scalia also wondered whether “meaningful
Presidential control is possible without the power to appoint and remove.”115
But if state and local police officials could be made legally obligated to obey
the President’s commands regarding the enforcement of federal law, it is not
clear what (that is, other than the anticommandeering doctrine or some-
thing akin to it) would prevent the President from removing them for failure
to obey those legal orders.  In any event, if state and local police officials
could be made legally obligated to obey the President’s commands regarding
the enforcement of federal law, at least those officials could be required by
federal courts, on pain of contempt, to obey those commands.
The breadth of federal criminal law is nearly limitless; a major brake on
federal law enforcement is the unwillingness of Congress to provide the
resources to fully enforce that law.  Imagine if the President could enforce
federal immigration laws by issuing commands to state and local police
rather than having to rely on Immigration and Customs Enforcement or
could enforce the federal drug laws by issuing commands to state and local
police rather than having to rely on the Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion.116  In 1997, when Printz was decided, Justice Breyer may have seen the
anticommandeering doctrine as an inappropriate way of “reconciling central
authority with the need to preserve the liberty-enhancing autonomy of a
112 See David Landau, Hannah J. Wiseman & Samuel R. Wiseman, Federalism for the Worst
Case, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1187, 1231 (2020) (“[E]liminating the anti-commandeering doc-
trine . . . would give a would-be despot an additional tool with which to consolidate power
rapidly.”).
113 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922–23 (1997) (“The insistence of the Framers
upon unity in the Federal Executive—to ensure both vigor and accountability—is well
known.  That unity would be shattered, and the power of the President would be subject to
reduction, if Congress could act as effectively without the President as with him, by simply
requiring state officers to execute its laws.” (footnote omitted) (first citing THE FEDERALIST
NO. 70, supra note 29 (Alexander Hamilton); and then citing 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 495 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976) (statement of James
Wilson)).
114 See id. at 922 (“The power of the Federal Government would be augmented immea-
surably if it were able to impress into its service—and at no cost to itself—the police
officers of the 50 States.”).
115 Id.
116 Cf. Landau et al., supra note 112, at 1204–05 (“[T]he core protection provided by
U.S. federalism against tyranny lies in the large number of state and local officials, not
subject to direct control from Washington, who carry out key functions that would-be
tyrants cannot rapidly or easily take over.”).
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smaller constituent governmental entity.”117  But two decades later, the world
might look a little different.
Finally, and more speculatively, Justice Alito might have secured the
agreement of Justices Breyer and Kagan, and the silence of Justices Ginsburg
and Sotomayor, by leaving some things unsaid.
First, no mention was made of Prigg v. Pennsylvania, the 1842 decision
that is sometimes thought to be the first articulation of the anticommandeer-
ing doctrine.118  In that case, Justice Story not only upheld the constitutional-
ity of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, and held the Pennsylvania personal
liberty law unconstitutional, but also stated that the Fugitive Slave Clause
“does not point out any state functionaries, or any state action, to carry its
provisions into effect.  The states cannot, therefore, be compelled to enforce
them.”119  Moreover, “it might well be deemed an unconstitutional exercise
of the power of interpretation, to insist that the states are bound to provide
means to carry into effect the duties of the national government, nowhere
delegated or intrusted to them by the Constitution.”120
In avoiding reliance on Prigg, Justice Alito by no means broke new
ground.  Instead, he merely followed the path taken in New York and Printz,
neither of which mentioned the decision.121  So, too, the parties in Murphy
avoided mention of Prigg.  Apparently, the advantages of association with Jus-
tice Story are outweighed by the disadvantages of association with what Paul
Finkelman has called “the most important judicial support for slavery in our
constitutional jurisprudence,” other than Dred Scott.122
Justice Alito also avoided any mention of Coyle, the case that Justice
O’Connor had cited in New York as proof that the anticommandeering doc-
trine was not new.123  Instead, he noted that “[a]lthough the anticom-
mandeering principle is simple and basic, it did not emerge in our cases until
relatively recently, when Congress attempted in a few isolated instances to
extend its authority in unprecedented ways,” and described New York as the
“pioneering case.”124
While Coyle can be seen as an anticommandeering case, it is also a case
about the equality of the states.  As an anticommandeering case, it held that
117 Printz, 521 U.S. at 977 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
118 See Blackman, supra note 98, at 968; Paul Finkelman, The Roots of Printz: Proslavery
Constitutionalism, National Law Enforcement, Federalism, and Local Cooperation, 69 BROOK. L.
REV. 1399, 1409 (2004).
119 Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16. Pet.) 539, 615 (1842).
120 Id. at 616.
121 See Blackman, supra note 98, at 979 (“Justice Alito, like Justice Scalia before him, did
not identify the application of the anticommandeering doctrine in Prigg v. Pennsylvania.”).
122 Finkelman, supra note 118, at 1410; see also Blackman, supra note 9898, at 970 R
(“Prigg, perhaps due to its odious subject matter, is seldom cited in discussions about com-
mandeering.”); cf. Hills, supra note 107, at 842 (“Ironically, the problem is not that Prigg is
too devoted to states’ rights, but rather that Prigg and its intellectual foundation in the
Marshall Court’s jurisprudence . . . are too nationalistic . . . .”).
123 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992).
124 Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1476 (2018).
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The power to locate its own seat of government, and to determine when and
how it shall be changed from one place to another, and to appropriate its
own public funds for that purpose, are essentially and peculiarly state pow-
ers.  That one of the original thirteen states could now be shorn of such
powers by an act of Congress would not be for a moment entertained.125
But as a state equality case, it held that a state could not be deprived of this
power and “be placed upon a plane of inequality with its sister States in the
Union” as a condition of admission.126
Its rhetorical commitment to state equality was powerful. Coyle stated
that our nation “was and is a union of States, equal in power, dignity and
authority,”127 and concluded with this peroration: “[T]he constitutional
equality of the States is essential to the harmonious operation of the scheme
upon which the Republic was organized.  When that equality disappears we
may remain a free people, but the Union will not be the Union of the
Constitution.”128
When Shelby County v. Holder held that the coverage formula in the Vot-
ing Rights Act was unconstitutional, it relied on the principle of equal sover-
eignty, citing Coyle.129  Indeed, “Shelby County relied primarily on two cases
for its discussion of the equal sovereignty doctrine: Coyle . . . and Northwest
Austin.”130
Given the importance of the Voting Rights Act, and the impassioned
dissent in Shelby County,131 avoiding any mention of Coyle might have helped
Justices Breyer and Kagan join the anticommandeering aspects of the Murphy
opinion, and helped keep Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor from saying any-
thing about commandeering.  In this connection, it might be worth noting
that certiorari petitions in an earlier round of litigation had raised both an
anticommandeering challenge and an equal sovereignty challenge to PASPA.
Those petitions were denied;132 the later petitions that were granted
dropped the equal sovereignty question.
Justice Alito also did not address whether the anticommandeering doc-
trine applies, or applies in the same way, when Congress exercises its power
under the Reconstruction Amendments, particularly Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment.  His opinion is written in broad terms and does not
125 Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 565 (1911).
126 Id.
127 Id. at 567.
128 Id. at 580.
129 570 U.S. 529, 544 (2013).
130 Mayhew v. Burwell, 772 F.3d 80, 94 n.12 (1st Cir. 2014) (first citing Coyle, 221 U.S.
559; and then citing Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009)).
131 Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Shelby County is what led to the moniker, “The Notori-
ous RBG.” See A Conversation with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Professor Aaron Saiger, 85
FORDHAM L. REV. 1497, 1503–04 (2017).
132 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n (3d Cir.
2013) (No. 13-967), 2014 WL 572929, cert. denied, 573 U.S. 931 (2014); Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, N.J. Thoroughbred Horsemen’s Ass’n, Inc. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n (3d
Cir. 2013) (No. 13-979), 2014 WL 636390, cert. denied, 573 U.S. 931 (2014).
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reserve the question.  For that reason, it might well be understood to apply to
all congressional powers.
However, in light of its context—an enactment purportedly under the
Commerce Clause—the opinion does not foreclose the possibility that it
might be distinguished in the context of the Reconstruction Amend-
ments.133  Under current precedent, Congress lacks the power to abrogate a
state’s sovereign immunity under its Article I, Section 8, powers.134  But it
may abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity under its power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment.135  Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is not,
under current precedent, a grant of power to regulate the people.136
Instead, it is a grant of power to enforce limitations on the states.
With a power structured so differently, the logic of the anticommandeer-
ing doctrine may not apply.  That is, exercise of congressional power under
Section 5 is not an exercise of power directly over the people, with contrary
state law displaced by operation of the Supremacy Clause.  Instead, it is an
exercise of power targeted at the states themselves.  Preemption may not
even be the right word for the operation of that kind of power; certainly, it
operates differently than ordinary preemption and is not a mere rule of
priority.
On the other hand, the provisions contained in Article I, Section 10, are
also prohibitions on the states.  Although there is no express power given to
Congress to enforce those prohibitions, the power to do so is implied, at least
according to Prigg.137  This may be yet another reason to avoid discussion of
Prigg.
Perhaps Justice Alito did not even consider Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.  Or perhaps, by not addressing this issue at all—not even to
133 See William D. Araiza, Reciprocal Concealed Carry: The Constitutional Issues, 46 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 571, 606 (2019) (“[T]here is a real question whether laws based on Congress’s
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power are subject to the anti-commandeering
restriction.”); Rappaport, supra note 107, at 854 (“[T]he immunity against regulating the
states . . . does not limit Congress’s power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.”).  As Rappaport notes, the anticommandeering doctrine also does not appear to
apply where Congress provides for the calling forth of the militia to execute the laws of the
union, id., but the Constitution here protects the states by reserving to them “the Appoint-
ment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
134 See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58–60, 66 (1996) (overruling
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989)). Compare Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz,
546 U.S. 356, 378–79 (2006) (concluding that states lack sovereign immunity with regard
to the Bankruptcy Clause itself), with Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1002–03 (2020)
(“[E]verything in Katz is about and limited to the Bankruptcy Clause; the opinion reflects
what might be called bankruptcy exceptionalism[,] . . . a good-for-one-clause-only
holding.”).
135 Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
136 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000); The Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
137 Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16. Pet.) 539, 619 (1842) (“[If an] end [is] required,
. . . the means to accomplish it are given also; or, in other words, that the power flows as a
necessary means to accomplish the end.”).
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expressly reserve it—he avoided igniting a battle that could instead be left for
another day.
Whatever the reasons, at the end of the day, and at least as applied to
congressional power under the Commerce Clause, the basic principle of the
anticommandeering doctrine may now be settled law.138
V. EXAGGERATIONS AND MISUNDERSTANDINGS
Perhaps because Murphy’s approach to the distinction between permissi-
ble preemption and impermissible commandeering was contrary to the con-
ventional approach, there have already been exaggerations and
misunderstandings of its impact.
Preemption of State Tax Laws.  Some have argued that Murphy calls into
question a wide range of federal laws that are phrased as prohibitions on
state taxes.139  One particular worry is that Murphy prevents Congress from
taking action in the area opened to states by the decision in Wayfair,140 which
permits states to require out-of-state vendors to collect use taxes.
These fears are unfounded.  Sure, Congress lacks the power to simply
negate a state tax.  But it continues to have the power to regulate interstate
commerce.  And as part of the power to regulate interstate commerce, it can
give private parties a right to engage in certain kinds of interstate commerce
free from state regulation or taxation.
What matters is not whether an act of Congress is phrased as a command
or a prohibition—Murphy is emphatic about that.141  What matters is
whether an act of Congress under the Commerce Clause is best understood
as a regulation of a private party even if, as the illustrations above show, Con-
gress commonly phrases the granting of private rights in the language of
state prohibition.142  And an act of Congress that gives private parties a right
138 As Mark Graber explains, “[s]ettlements take place, not when official law is pro-
nounced, but when persons opposed to that constitutional status quo abandon efforts to
secure revision.”  Mark A. Graber, Settling the West: The Annexation of Texas, The Louisiana
Purchase, and Bush v. Gore, in THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND AMERICAN EXPANSION,
1803–1898, at 83, 84–85 (Sanford Levinson & Bartholomew H. Sparrow eds., 2005); see also
William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1, 18 (2019) (“The key idea of
acquiescence was that the losers in some sense gave up.”).
139 E.g. Brnovich, supra note 83, at 262; Daniel Hemel, Justice Alito, State Tax Hero?,
MEDIUM (May 15, 2018), https://medium.com/whatever-source-derived/justice-alito-state-
tax-hero-333830d097ab.
140 South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).
141 Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1480 (2018) (“[The Air-
line Deregulation Act] might appear to operate directly on the States, but it is a mistake to
be confused by the way in which a preemption provision is phrased. . . .  And if we look
beyond the phrasing employed . . . , it is clear that this provision operates just like any
other federal law with preemptive effect.  It confers on private entities (i.e., covered carri-
ers) a federal right to engage in certain conduct subject only to certain (federal)
constraints.”).
142 This understanding of preemption also helps explain when parties can use § 1983
to raise preemption claims. See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S.
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to engage in certain forms of interstate commerce without being subject to
certain kinds of state regulation or state taxation is permissible and common-
place.  That’s just Gibbons v. Ogden again.143
Daniel Hemel claims,
Any federal law that says “states cannot regulate X” can be redescribed as a
law that says “private actors have the right to do X notwithstanding any state
law to the contrary”; any law that says “states cannot authorize X” can be
redescribed as a law that says “private actors are prohibited from doing X
notwithstanding any state law that authorizes them.”144
The first claim may well be true.  If so, that would mean that the anticom-
mandeering doctrine presents no obstacle to federal grants of liberty.  (Of
course, the grant must otherwise be within an enumerated power of Con-
gress—not a high bar, particularly where commercial activities are at issue.)
But the second claim is certainly not true.  Consider a federal law that
says “states cannot authorize any person to possess marijuana.”  That does not
create a federal law prohibition on the possession of marijuana.  It creates no
federal crime.  It creates no federal duty on any person to refrain from pos-
sessing marijuana.  It gives no person a right of action to prevent another
from possessing marijuana.  It does nothing at all to change the legal status
of marijuana possession under federal law.
To be sure, such a statute might be read to obligate a state to prohibit
the possession of marijuana.  But that is precisely what the anticommandeer-
ing doctrine insists Congress cannot do.145
103, 108 (1989); see also Henry Paul Monaghan, Federal Statutory Review Under Section 1983
and the APA, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 233, 260 (1991).
143 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211–12 (1824).  To the extent that the
federal government insists that itself, its instrumentalities, its officers, and its transactions
be governed by federal law rather than state law (including state tax law), it is just
M’Culloch v. Maryland again. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).  Both Gibbons and M’Culloch
would be easier cases, not harder cases, if the respective acts of Congress had expressly
provided that the state law at issue must give way to federal law, rather than leave that to
implication.
144 Hemel, supra note 139.
145 Some have found it not clear whether Murphy means that Congress “could prevent a
state from legalizing marijuana.”  Matthew A. Melone, Murphy v. NCAA & South Dakota v.
Wayfair, Inc.: The Court’s Anticommandeering Jurisprudence May Preclude Congressional Action
with Respect to Sales Taxes on Internet Sales, 67 DRAKE L. REV. 413, 447 n.204 (2019).  But
there is no uncertainty here: Congress cannot prohibit a state from legalizing marijuana
because that is the same thing as requiring a state to prohibit marijuana.  Congress can,
and has, prohibited the possession of marijuana as a matter of federal law.  But that prohi-
bition in no way obligates—or empowers Congress to obligate—the states to have a similar
prohibition. See, e.g., In re State Question No. 807, Initiative Petition No. 423, 2020 OK 57,
¶ 26, 468 P.3d 383, 391 (“Further, the federal government lacks the power to compel
Oklahoma, or any other state, . . . to criminalize possession and use of marijuana under
state law.” (citing Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1475–79)).  Some think that Congress has already
effectively prohibited the states from legalizing marijuana because the existing federal pro-
hibition on marijuana does regulate the conduct of private actors, making anticom-
mandeering principles irrelevant and leaving only obstacle preemption principles in play.
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If this seems asymmetrical, it is an asymmetry biased toward liberty.
While Congress can give liberty rights that states must respect, it cannot com-
pel states to restrict liberty.  And finding that a constitutional doctrine has an
asymmetry biased toward liberty shouldn’t be the least bit surprising.
Matt Melone contends that in “the absence of a national sales tax, it is
unclear whether Congress can impose” uniform standards establishing the
circumstances in which states can collect sales tax from remote sellers.146
But completely apart from the congressional power to impose a tax (and
without entering into the debate about the constitutionality of a national
sales tax), Congress has the power to regulate interstate commerce.  And as
part of that power, Congress can give participants in that commerce a federal
right to be free of state regulation and taxation.  Again, that has been clear
since at least Gibbons v. Ogden.
Melone is particularly concerned about the impact of Murphy in the
aftermath of the decision in South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.147  In Wayfair, the
Supreme Court overruled its prior precedent that had understood the dor-
mant Commerce Clause to prohibit states from imposing the duty to collect
sales and use taxes on those without a physical presence in the state. Wayfair
held that a physical presence was not required.148
Melone believes that prior to Wayfair, Congress could have established
standards that, if met by a state, would empower that state to collect sales and
use taxes from sellers without a physical presence in the state.149  However,
he contends that such legislation would be unconstitutional after Wayfair and
Murphy because it “does not confer rights or impose obligations on private
actors.”150  But that is just wrong: a federal act that sets standards for when
E.g., In re State Question No. 807, 468 P.3d at 398 (Kane, J., dissenting) (“Here, there is no
question the CSA regulates the conduct of private actors . . . .  Therefore, the only inquiry
is whether the proposed state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-
tion of the full purposes and objectives of the CSA . . . .”); id. at 399 (Rowe, J., dissenting).
But if a decision by a state to decline to prohibit certain conduct counts as an “obstacle” to
federal law, we are right back to federal law requiring a state to prohibit that conduct—
precisely what the anticommandeering doctrine forbids.  There is no reason to think that
courts are somehow authorized to infer from a statute what Congress is constitutionally
prohibited from stating directly in a statute.
146 Matthew A. Melone, New Jersey Beat the Spread: Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic
Association and the Demise of PASPA Allows for States to Experiment in Regulating the Rapidly
Evolving Sports Gambling Industry, 80 U. PITT. L. REV. 315, 353 (2018).
147 Melone, supra note 145; see South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).
148 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2080 (overruling Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298
(1992), and Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967)).
149 Melone, supra note 145, at 458 (“[T]he Remote Transactions Parity Act of 2015
would have passed constitutional muster had it been enacted in 2015 and challenged at
that time.  Because National Bellas Hess, Inc. and Quill Corp. were controlling precedent, the
federal government had the authority to dictate terms to states in order for states to take
action that would otherwise have violated the dormant Commerce Clause.”).
150 Id. at 459.  Melone has made a parallel argument—with identical flaw—about a
different federal statute that, in some circumstances, prohibits a state from imposing on
persons who are neither residents nor domiciliaries of that state “a net income tax on the
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state taxes may be collected on an interstate sale is a regulation of that inter-
state commerce and gives private parties a federal right to be free of state
taxation when engaging in that commerce unless the states meet the federal
standard.151
And the decision in Wayfair does nothing to change this analysis.  All
Wayfair does is change the burden of overcoming congressional inertia.
Prior to Wayfair, private parties without a physical presence in a state had a
federal right to engage in interstate transactions with those in that state free
of a state-law obligation to collect sales tax, unless Congress said otherwise.
After Wayfair, private parties without a physical presence in a state lack a
federal right to engage in interstate transactions with those in that state free
of a state-law obligation to collect sales tax, unless Congress says otherwise.
That is the way the dormant Commerce Clause works: the question in
such cases is whether or not the dormant, sleeping, unexercised, power of
Congress to regulate commerce should be understood to give private parties
a right to engage in the commerce at issue free from the challenged state
regulation.152  If so, the private parties have such a federal right; if not, they
don’t.  But either way, Congress can exercise its power to regulate interstate
commerce either to remove the federal right that the judiciary found or to
grant the federal right that the judiciary did not find.  Perhaps more bluntly:
if courts can find a federal right to be free of state regulation in the unexer-
cised power of Congress, of course Congress can exercise its power to grant
such a federal right.  The very premise of a judicial recognition of such a
right in congressional silence is that Congress has the power to grant such a
right.
Proportionality.  Darien Shanske, noting that “all nine Justices in Wayfair
seemed to believe that Congress can (and should) provide uniform ground
rules” dealing with the collection of sales taxes, contends that Murphy should
income derived within such State by any person from interstate commerce.”  Matthew A.
Melone, Pub. L. No. 86-272 and the Anti-Commandeering Doctrine: Is This Anachronism Constitu-
tionally Vulnerable After Murphy v. NCAA?, 9 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 201,
216 (2020) (quoting Interstate Income Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-272, 73 Stat. 555 (1959)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 381–383 (2019))).  Under the Commerce Clause, Congress can
give private parties a right to engage in interstate commerce free of state regulation or
taxation, and a prohibition on state taxation of certain kinds of interstate commerce is
easily construed as a grant of exactly that right.
151 If there are limits to the power of Congress to grant the right to engage in interstate
commerce free of state taxation, they are not to be found in the anticommandeering doc-
trine.  The Commerce Clause itself is not unlimited, so (for example) a right of a state
resident to own real property free of state taxation in that state might be beyond the scope
of the Commerce Clause, thus insulating state property taxes from Commerce Clause
preemption.
152 Thus, it is not correct to say that the “dormant Commerce Clause authorizes federal
regulation of state laws.”  David M. Driesen, Inactivity, Deregulation, and the Commerce Clause:
A Thought Experiment, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 479, 497 (2018).  Instead, the dormant Com-
merce Clause recognizes, in some instances, a right to engage in interstate commerce.
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be read as embodying a “proportionality principle.”153  While proportionality
as an approach to constitutional adjudication—and more generally trying to
move judicial review under the United States Constitution closer toward the
European model of freestanding constitutional courts—is all the rage these
days,154 it is not a persuasive account of the anticommandeering doctrine.
To the extent that Shanske relies on concerns about what Murphy means
for federal preemption of state taxes, the discussion above need not be
repeated.  Beyond this, the opinions in New York and Printz could not be
clearer that they do not call for a judicial determination of whether “the
federal government [went] too far,” as opposed to “a formal test” for
commandeering.155
New York:
But whether or not a particularly strong federal interest enables Congress to
bring state governments within the orbit of generally applicable federal regu-
lation, no Member of the Court has ever suggested that such a federal inter-
est would enable Congress to command a state government to enact state
regulation.  No matter how powerful the federal interest involved, the Con-
stitution simply does not give Congress the authority to require the States to
regulate.  The Constitution instead gives Congress the authority to regulate
matters directly and to pre-empt contrary state regulation.  Where a federal
interest is sufficiently strong to cause Congress to legislate, it must do so
directly; it may not conscript state governments as its agents.156
Printz:
Finally, the Government puts forward a cluster of arguments that can be
grouped under the heading: “The Brady Act serves very important purposes,
is most efficiently administered by CLEOs during the interim period, and
places a minimal and only temporary burden upon state officers.” . . . But
where, as here, it is the whole object of the law to direct the functioning of
the state executive, and hence to compromise the structural framework of
dual sovereignty, such a “balancing” analysis is inappropriate.  It is the very
principle of separate state sovereignty that such a law offends, and no com-
parative assessment of the various interests can overcome that fundamental
defect.  We expressly rejected such an approach in New York . . . .  We adhere
to that principle today and conclude categorically, as we concluded categori-
cally in New York . . . .157
It is true that Justice Alito’s opinion in Murphy does not repeat these
passages from New York and Printz.  But there is not a word in Murphy to
repudiate them.  Shanske observes that the opinion early on states that
“Americans have never been of one mind about gambling, and attitudes have
153 Darien Shanske, Proportionality as Hidden (but Emerging?) Touchstone of American Feder-
alism: Reflections on the Wayfair Decision, 22 CHAP. L. REV. 73, 83 (2019).
154 See, e.g., Jamal Greene, Foreword, Rights as Trumps?, 132 HARV. L. REV. 28 (2018).
155 Shanske, supra note 153, at 83.
156 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178 (1992).
157 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 931–33 (1997) (footnote and citations
omitted).
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swung back and forth.”158  But Justice Alito bookends this with his conclud-
ing statement that
[t]he legalization of sports gambling is a controversial subject. . . .
The legalization of sports gambling requires an important policy choice,
but the choice is not ours to make.  Congress can regulate sports gambling
directly, but if it elects not to do so, each State is free to act on its own.159
Shanske reads Murphy as effectively holding that “[t]he federal govern-
ment has thus taken a position on a controversial topic on which there is
considerable disagreement and on which there seems to be little imperative
for a national solution.”160  Shanske’s phrasing seems to suggest that a direct
national prohibition of sports betting would also be unconstitutional, but
that result would be flatly inconsistent with Justice Alito’s closing passage.161
Clarity.  Vikram Amar has described Murphy as “perplexing” and argued
that it should be understood not on its own terms, but as instead standing for
an unstated constitutional requirement of “clarity” in conditional preemp-
tion statutes.162  His primary target is Justice Alito’s statement that “even if ”
PASPA could be interpreted to permit complete repeals while prohibiting
(some) partial repeals, “it would still violate the anticommandeering principle.”163
As he sees it, there would be no constitutional problem (other than a lack of
clarity) if PASPA were understood to give the states the following choices:
(1) states can continue to prohibit sports gambling, and if they do they won’t
be preempted by federal law . . . ;
(2) states can repeal their prohibitions on sports gambling entirely if they
like;
(3) they may not enforce a selective repeal of their prohibitions in a way that
favors certain entities, such as casinos and racetracks; and
(4) if they do selectively repeal and discriminate in favor of some entities,
state law will be preempted by federal law, and federal law will kick in to
prohibit sports gambling by those favored entities.164
But as his phrasing of the fourth option reveals, this approach still
wouldn’t save § 3702(1), the challenged section of PASPA—which doesn’t
158 Shanske, supra note 153, at 84 (quoting Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,
138 S. Ct. 1461, 1468 (2018)).
159 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1484–85.
160 Shanske, supra note 153, at 84.
161 Note that this passage in the Alito opinion does not address whether the Commerce
Clause permits Congress to reach all sports gambling, or whether there is some sports
gambling that is insufficiently connected to interstate commerce to permit congressional
regulation. Cf. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1485 (Thomas, J., concurring) (joining the Alito opin-
ion “in its entirety,” while stating, “[u]nlike the dissent, I do ‘doubt’ that Congress can
prohibit sports gambling that does not cross state lines”).
162 Amar, supra note 111, at 299–301.
163 Id. at 306 (quoting Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1475).
164 Id. at 313.
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call for the federal law to kick in against the private entities, but instead
makes the state’s action the basis of a right of action under § 3703 against
state officials to control the state’s actions.165  And as reflection on the third
option reveals, an injunction against state executives not to “enforce” a
repeal of state law is equivalent to an injunction to enforce the repealed law.
In the end, Amar’s approach does not justify § 3702(1) but is instead a vari-
ant of the dissent’s argument that § 3702(2)—which prohibits a private per-
son from engaging in a sports betting scheme “pursuant to the law . . . of a
government entity”—is severable from § 3702(1).166
Amar provides good reasons “to harmonize conditional spending and
conditional preemption by requiring particular clarity in both settings, where
the applicability of federal law will depend on legislative choices states are
being encouraged—indeed invited—to make.”167  But there is no need to
rewrite Murphy to rest on that principle.
Reciprocal Concealed Carry.  William Araiza has argued that a portion of
the proposed (but not enacted) Concealed Carry Reciprocity Act of 2017
would be unconstitutional under Murphy.168  That Act would provide, in gen-
eral, that a person who is not prohibited by federal law from possessing a
firearm, and who is carrying both a valid photo identification and a valid
state-issued concealed carry permit, may carry a concealed handgun in other
states.169  It also provides that a person who carries a concealed handgun in
accordance with the Act may not be arrested for violation of state law regard-
ing the carrying of firearms “unless there is probable cause to believe that the
person is doing so in a manner not provided for in this section.” 170  Moreo-
ver, it provides that presentation of “facially valid” photo identification and
165 See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1488 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“[Section] 3702(2) applies federal policy directly to individuals while the challenged part
of § 3702(1) forces the States to prohibit sports gambling schemes (thereby shifting the
burden of enforcing federal regulatory policy from the Federal Government to state
governments).”).
166 28 U.S.C. § 3702(2) (2018). See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1489 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(“Leaving out the alleged infirmity, i.e., ‘commandeering’ state regulatory action by
prohibiting the States from ‘authoriz[ing]’ and ‘licens[ing]’ sports-gambling schemes, 28
U.S.C. § 3702(1), two federal edicts should remain intact.” (alterations in original)).  Eval-
uating the severability aspect of Murphy is beyond the scope of this Article.
There was no injunction in Murphy against a private party under § 3702(2) because to
issue such an injunction the district court would have had to address the argument that the
sports leagues were not entitled to equitable relief because of their unclean hands. See
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, 61 F. Supp. 3d 488, 497 n.7 (D.N.J. 2014) (“[N]o
injunction is being entered against the NJTHA.  Therefore, it is unnecessary for the Court
to determine the validity of the NJTHA’s assertion of unclean hands.”).  The injunction
against the state officials, however, effectively constrained the private party by putting state
officials at risk of contempt if they failed to enforce the repealed state law against the
private party.
167 Amar, supra note 111, at 320.
168 Araiza, supra note 133, at 603–07.
169 Concealed Carry Reciprocity Act of 2017, H.R. 38, 115th Cong. § 101(a) (2017).
170 Id.
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concealed carry permit “is prima facie evidence that the individual has a
license or permit as required by this section.”171
Araiza correctly acknowledges that one “could analogize the holder of
the federally-endorsed state-issued concealed carry permit with Thomas Gib-
bons from Gibbons v. Ogden, who held a federal coasting license that the
Supremacy Clause required New York authorities to recognize as superseding
Aaron Ogden’s conflicting state-granted monopoly.”172  But he thinks that
the “prescription of particular police procedures” cannot be read as a grant
of a license to private parties “if Murphy’s distinction between regulation of
states and regulation of individuals is to be accorded any force.”173
But the proposed Act can easily be read as a grant of a (limited) federal
license to be free from state arrest.  The point would perhaps be clearer if the
right were less limited: suppose Congress were to provide that a holder of a
federal gun permit could not be arrested by state officials at all for gun pos-
session.  That would plainly be a grant of a federal right to a private party,
and (assuming federal power to grant the license in the first place) not com-
mandeer the states in any way.  For example, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 not
only provided private parties with a federal right to “full and equal enjoyment
of the goods, services, . . . and accommodations of any place of public accom-
modation,” 174 but also provided that no person shall “punish or attempt to
punish any person for exercising or attempting to exercise” that federal
right.175
Nothing changes with the more limited federal license in the proposed
Act.  The states and their officials must stand aside and recognize the federal
right, unless they have probable cause to believe that the person is not enti-
tled to that federal right.  This is a limitation on the federal right and no
more commandeers a state to regulate the people than a commonplace sav-
ing clause in a preemption provision commandeers a state to regulate the
people.176  And if the proposed Act ever becomes law, it may prove to be an
especially valuable limitation on the federal right for state officials, because
171 Id.
172 Araiza, supra note 133, at 603 (footnote omitted).
173 Id. at 604.
174 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2012).
175 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2 (2012); see Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 311 (1964)
(“In effect the Act prohibits the application of state laws in a way that would deprive any
person of the rights granted under the Act.”); see also Johnson v. Mississippi, 421 U.S. 213,
235 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (describing Rachel as requiring “that the federal law
invoked by the petitioners . . . do more than merely provide a defense to conviction: it
must immunize them from arrest and prosecution for the conduct in question”); Georgia
v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 804 (1966) (“Hamm emphasized the precise terms of § 203(c) that
prohibit any ‘attempt to punish’ persons for exercising rights of equality conferred upon
them by the Act.”).
176 See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 867–68 (2000) (interpreting a
saving clause providing that compliance with a federal safety standard “does not exempt
any person from liability under common law”) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (1988)).
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the proposed Act also creates a private right of action for damages against
those who deprive a person of the rights it creates.177
This understanding of the proposed Act does not deprive Murphy’s dis-
tinction of force.  If the proposed Act were to require states to prohibit con-
cealed carry—whether phrased as a duty to prohibit concealed carry or a
prohibition on licensing concealed carry—the anticommandeering doctrine
would be violated.  If the proposed Act were to require states’ officials to
enforce federal limitations on the possession of guns—whether phrased as a
duty to do so or a prohibition on failing to do so—the anticommandeering
doctrine would be violated.178
Again, if this seems asymmetrical, it is an asymmetry biased toward lib-
erty.  While Congress can give liberty rights that states must respect, it cannot
compel states to restrict liberty.  And finding that a constitutional doctrine
has an asymmetry biased toward liberty shouldn’t be the least bit surprising.
Deregulation.  Despite Justice Alito’s explanation of how deregulatory stat-
utes operate to create federal rights,179  David Driesen has argued that Mur-
phy means that “stand-alone” federal deregulatory laws—by which he means
laws “that deregulates for some purpose other than advancing regulation”—
are unconstitutional.180  He points to the Graves Amendment, which deregu-
lates rental car companies, and to the Protection of Lawful Commerce in
Arms Act, which deregulates companies providing guns.181
But both of those statutes create (limited) federal rights to engage in
interstate commerce: renting cars and selling guns.  And it has been clear
since at least Gibbons v. Ogden that creating a federal right to engage in inter-
state commerce is a regulation of interstate commerce.  The “power to regu-
late” interstate commerce is the power “to prescribe the rule by which
commerce is to be governed.”182  And the “rule by which commerce is to be
governed” can be freedom within the limits set by Congress.183
177 Concealed Carry Reciprocity Act of 2017, H.R. 38, 115th Cong. § 101(a) (2017).
178 Nor can Congress evade this with wordplay, such as attempting to create a “private
right” consisting of a requirement that the States prohibit someone else’s action. Cf.
Melone, supra note 146, at 348 (suggesting that PASPA could be read to “confer rights on
the professional sports leagues and the National Collegiate Athletic Association . . . to
conduct their affairs free of any state sanctioned activity to which they are opposed”).
179 Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1480 (2018) (stating that
the Airline Deregulation Act “confers on private entities (i.e., covered carriers) a federal
right to engage in certain conduct subject only to certain (federal) constraints”).
180 Driesen, supra note 152, at 509; id. at 506 n.225 (“I use the term ‘stand-alone’ der-
egulation to refer to a law that deregulates for some purpose other than advancing
regulation.”).
181 Id. at 481; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–7903 (2018); 49 U.S.C. § 30106 (2012).
182 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824).
183 See Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364, 367 (2008) (noting that Con-
gress had chosen “maximum reliance on competitive market forces” (quoting Morales v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378 (1992))); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 19
n.29 (2005) (noting that it is “of no constitutional import” whether Congress seeks “to
protect and stabilize” or “eradicate” a market); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128
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Perhaps some might seize on Justice Alito’s description of the Airline
Deregulation Act as conferring “a federal right to engage in certain conduct
subject only to certain (federal) constraints”184 and contend that there must
be some federal constraint in order to be a constitutionally valid regulation of
interstate commerce triggering preemption.  But such a “constraint” need be
nothing more than the federal law limits that “constrain” that right.  And
such constraints are clearly present in both the Graves Amendment and the
Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act.  The Arms Act, for example,
limits its protection of gun manufacturers to those who are federally
licensed.185  The Graves Amendment similarly protects only those “engaged
in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles,” to the extent
that they engage in “no negligence or criminal wrongdoing.”186
Immigration.  There has been substantial discussion and litigation con-
cerning the impact of the Murphy decision on immigration.  Three aspects
are of particular note.  First, there is ongoing litigation between the United
States and California, with the United States contending that California law
limiting cooperation between its jailers and federal immigration authorities is
preempted, and not protected by the anticommandeering doctrine.
Although the Supreme Court has denied certiorari over two dissents—after
considering the case at more than a dozen conferences stretching from Janu-
ary to June187—the case continues because the Court was asked to review the
affirmance of a preliminary injunction.  Second, numerous courts and com-
mentators have addressed the constitutionality of a federal statute that bars
states and local governments from restricting certain communication regard-
ing immigration by government entities or officials.188  Third, a Harvard Law
Review note argues that the anticommandeering doctrine prevents the
(1942) (“The stimulation of commerce is a use of the regulatory function quite as defi-
nitely as prohibitions or restrictions thereon.”).
184 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1480 (emphasis added).
185 15 U.S.C. § 7903(2) (2018).
186 49 U.S.C. § 30106(a)(1)–(2) (2012).
187 United States v. California, No. 19-532, 2020 WL 3146844, at *1 (U.S. June 15,
2020), denying cert. to 921 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 2019).  Justices Thomas and Alito dissented
from the denial without opinion.  The case was distributed for conference on January 10,
January 17, March 5, March 20, March 27, April 3, April 17, April 24, May 1, May 15, May
21, May 28, June 4, and June 11, 2020. No. 19-532, SUPREMECOURT.GOV, https://www.
supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/Docket/docketfiles/html/public/19-532.html#
(last visited Sept. 12, 2020).
188 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2018).  See, e.g., New York v. Dep’t of Just., 951 F.3d 84, 111 (2d Cir.
2020); United States v. California, 921 F.3d 865, 893 n.19 (9th Cir. 2019); Bernard W. Bell,
A New Sheriff’s in Town: The Trump Administration and “Sanctuary” Jurisdictions, 87 UMKC L.
REV. 629, 649–51 (2019); Blackman, supra note 98, at 982–89; Nelson Lund, The Constitu-
tionality of Immigration Sanctuaries and Anti-Sanctuaries: Originalism, Current Doctrine, and a
Second-Best Alternative, 21 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 991, 1015–17 (2019).  Rehearing en banc of
New York was denied by a vote of eight to four, with two of the eight voting against rehear-
ing only because they viewed certiorari and reversal as more efficient.  New York v. U.S.
Dep’t of Just., 964 F.3d 150, 156 (2d Cir. 2020) (Lohier, J., concurring) (“Under these
circumstances, the better course, in my view, is for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari
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national government from relying on state convictions as a basis for
deportation.189
Limiting Cooperation.  The California law at issue in the litigation between
the United States and California restricts the authority of state and local offi-
cials to inform immigration officials about a person’s release date from state
custody, as well as their authority to transfer individuals in their custody to
immigration officials.190  The United States contends that this state law is
preempted because it is an obstacle to federal immigration law, which both
prevents the Attorney General from removing an alien from the United
States while that alien is serving time in state prison191 and requires the
Attorney General to take custody of certain aliens “when the alien is
released.”192  By blocking communication about release dates and coopera-
tion about transfer of custody, the result is that immigration officials must, in
and reverse.  It can do so faster than we can, and it alone can forestall the spread of this
grievous error.”).
Many of the cases arise in the context of challenges to the Attorney General’s insis-
tence that recipients of certain federal funds comply with § 1373.  In that context, some
courts avoid deciding the anticommandeering question by holding that the Attorney Gen-
eral lacks the statutory authority to impose the condition. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Barr,
961 F.3d 882, 898 (7th Cir. 2020) (“[W]e need not address the district court’s compelling
analysis of that Tenth Amendment issue, because we hold that the term ‘all other applica-
ble federal law’ cannot be construed so broadly as to encompass § 1373.”); City of Philadel-
phia v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 916 F.3d 276, 279 (3d Cir. 2019) (“The City attacked the
government’s ability to impose the Challenged Conditions on several statutory and consti-
tutional fronts.  But we need only reach the threshold statutory question.”); cf. Colorado v.
U.S. Dep’t of Just., 2020 WL 1955474, at *18, *20 (D. Colo. Apr. 23, 2020) (rejecting argu-
ment that “§§ 1373 and 1644 merely preempt states and local governments from interfer-
ing with federal immigration regulation and enforcement,” because “they do not regulate
private actors,” but “stop[ping] short of ruling the statutes unconstitutional because I oth-
erwise find the challenged conditions unlawful and need not do so”).
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that the Attorney General has
statutory authority to impose the condition, requiring it to reach the constitutional ques-
tion. New York, 951 F.3d at 111 (“This court, however, cannot avoid the issue in light of our
ruling that the Certification Condition is statutorily authorized.”).  But it reached only a
narrow constitutional question, concluding that § 1373 “does not violate the Tenth
Amendment as applied here to a federal funding requirement.” Id. at 114 (emphasis omit-
ted).  On petition for rehearing en banc, three judges stated that “[e]very other court to
have considered the issue post-Murphy reached the correct conclusion: Section 1373 vio-
lates the Tenth Amendment and is unconstitutional, even as applied to the situation at
hand.” New York, 964 F.3d at 165 (Pooler, J., dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc). See
City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 309 F. Supp. 3d 289, 331 (E.D. Pa. 2018); City of Chicago v.
Sessions, 321 F. Supp. 3d 855, 872 (N.D. Ill. 2018); City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. Ses-
sions, 349 F. Supp. 3d 924, 953 (N.D. Cal. 2018); cf. United States v. California, 314 F.
Supp. 3d 1077, 1101 (E.D. Cal. 2018).
189 States’ Commandeered Convictions, supra note 19, at 2327.
190 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7284.6 (West 2020).
191 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(4) (2018).
192 Id. § 1226(c); see Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954, 963–968 (2019).
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effect, stake out a jail in order to make a public arrest rather than have a
custody hand-off inside a secure facility.193
The United States contends that the anticommandeering doctrine can-
not apply because there is no federal statute “that orders California to adopt
or implement (or refrain from adopting or implementing) a regulatory pro-
gram.”194  But that can’t be right, because it would mean that such orders
commandeering state legislatures and executives would be permissible so
long as they weren’t embodied in a federal statute.
More plausibly, the United States contends that the anticommandeering
principle is not violated because the immigration laws do impose restrictions
and confer rights on private actors: the aliens whose detention and removal
are governed by those laws.195  But those restrictions and rights are not what
is at issue in the case, for no one denies that federal authorities can arrest,
detain, and remove the aliens in accordance with federal law.  And no one
thinks that state law can block the federal officials from doing so.  The ques-
tion is whether state law can prohibit state officials from cooperating in that
effort.  The United States tries to elide the distinction by describing both
federal and state law as addressed to the same question: “the procedures by
which aliens are detained and removed.”196  But this use of the passive voice
obscures who is doing the detaining: when someone is in state custody, the
state is doing the detaining.  The reasoning of the United States would allow
a federal statute to require that the alien be detained until removal and pre-
empt state law that required release upon expiration of the sentence—
because these would be conflicting schemes governing detention and
release.  But a federal law that required the state to detain someone—as
opposed to empowering the federal government to detain that person
itself—would be precisely what the anticommandeering doctrine forbids.
The United States complains, invoking a comparison to Arizona v. United
States,197 that it “cannot be that conflict preemption bars a State from adopt-
ing its own policies regulating the presence and detention of aliens that are
designed to enhance federal immigration enforcement, yet permits a State to
adopt its own policies on such matters that are designed to obstruct federal
enforcement.”198
But once one clears away the brush and sees that the “obstruction”
involved is not blocking federal law enforcement, but simply refusing to assist
federal law enforcement,199 this asymmetry is simply another version of the
193 Brief for Petitioner at 13, United States v. California, 2020 WL 3146844 (2020) (No.
19-532), 2019 WL 5448580.
194 Id. at 24.
195 Id. at 25.
196 Id.
197 567 U.S. 387 (2012).
198 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 193, at 19.
199 United States v. California, 921 F.3d 865, 888 (9th Cir. 2019) (agreeing with the
district court that “refusing to help is not the same as impeding” (quoting United States v.
California, 314 F. Supp. 3d 1077, 1104 (E.D. Cal. 2018))); City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888
F.3d 272, 282 (7th Cir.) (labelling a “red herring” the characterization as thwarting federal
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asymmetry in favor of liberty that we saw earlier: the federal government can
create a right in a person to be free of state control but cannot create an
obligation that a state legislature or executive control a person or help the
federal government to control that person.  This is true whether we are talk-
ing about immigration or pharmaceuticals: the federal government can cre-
ate an exclusive regulatory regime that gives people the freedom from state
regulation (including state regulation that seeks to enhance enforcement of
the federal regulatory regime) but cannot require the state legislature or
executive to assist in the enforcement of that federal regulatory regime.
And it is an asymmetry reflected in the fundamentals of habeas corpus: a
federal writ of habeas corpus can issue to a state jailer to require that the
jailer recognize a prisoner’s federal right to freedom, but a federal writ of
habeas corpus cannot issue to a state jailer to require that a jailer keep a
person in prison based on a federal law that demands incarceration.
Less plausibly, the United States contends that Congress gave states a
choice between (1) assisting (what the United States calls “not
obstruct[ing]”) immigration enforcement and (2) not subjecting aliens to
the state criminal justice system at all.200  It is hard to see how this choice was
presented clearly enough to the states for them to have accepted the deal.201
And it is hard to imagine Congress enacting such a statute, except perhaps as
a way of playing chicken with the states.  But even if the statute expressly
offered the states this choice, it would—almost literally—be a “gun to the
head” coercing the states: agree to our conditions or do nothing when crimi-
nal aliens murder people with gunshots to the head, or rape them with guns
pointed at their heads.202
law enforcement because “nothing in this case involves any affirmative interference with fed-
eral law enforcement at all, nor is there any interference whatsoever with federal immigra-
tion authorities.  The only conduct at issue here is the refusal of the local law enforcement
to aid in civil immigration enforcement through informing the federal authorities when
persons are in their custody and providing access to those persons at the local law enforce-
ment facility”), reh’g en banc granted in part, vacated in part, No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 4268817
(7th Cir. June 4, 2018), vacated, No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 4268814 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2018).
200 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 193, at 29.
201 Cf. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006)
(“States cannot knowingly accept conditions of which they are ‘unaware’ or which they are
‘unable to ascertain.’” (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17
(1981))); Amar, supra note 110, at 320 (arguing in favor of “harmoniz[ing] conditional
spending and conditional preemption by requiring particular clarity in both settings,
where the applicability of federal law will depend on legislative choices states are being
encouraged—indeed invited—to make”).
202 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 581 (2012) (plurality opin-
ion) (describing the Medicaid condition in the Affordable Care Act as “a gun to the
head”).  It should go without saying, but just in case: I do not mean to suggest that all or
most aliens—or even a disproportionate number of aliens—are murderers and rapists.
But obviously some are.
I do not take a position here on whether Sebelius should be understood as relying on
the amount of dollars involved. See Amar, supra note 110, at 334–35 (arguing that “a care-
ful reading of Sebelius indicates that a sufficient reason Obamacare was deemed coercive
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Limiting Communication.  The federal statute prohibiting states from
restricting the communication of information regarding immigration status
by state and local entities or officials presents a more difficult question.  The
statute provides, in relevant part:
(a) In general
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, a
Federal, State, or local government entity or official may not prohibit, or in
any way restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, or receiv-
ing from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding
the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual.
(b) Additional authority of government entities
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, no
person or agency may prohibit, or in any way restrict, a Federal, State, or
local government entity from doing any of the following with respect to
information regarding the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any
individual:
(1) Sending such information to, or requesting or receiving such informa-
tion from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
(2) Maintaining such information.
(3) Exchanging such information with any other Federal, State, or local
government entity.203
To the extent that this statute limits how the states can control their own
governmental entities, it runs afoul of the anticommandeering doctrine for
the same reasons the California provisions discussed above are not pre-
empted.  It is not a regulation of private conduct, nor a grant of a right to a
private person.204
was that Congress was imposing new terms onto a preexisting deal,” rather than “any sub-
stantive unfairness that enforcing the terms of an agreed-upon deal would visit upon the
states”).  But it is hard to imagine Congress suggesting complete immunity from state crim-
inal law for aliens, except as a means of coercing the states.  (To the extent that the United
States is not suggesting a federally bestowed immunity from state prosecution, but merely
suggesting that the national government has the constitutional authority to take custody of
and deport aliens without awaiting the result of any state criminal process, the suggestion
seems uncontroversial.  But it is very hard to find in the statute a condition that the
national government will forebear from immediate custody and deportation of an alien
charged with state crime only if the state facilitates the transfer of aliens from state to
federal custody.)
203 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a)–(b) (2018); see also id. § 1644 (“Notwithstanding any other provi-
sion of Federal, State, or local law, no State or local government entity may be prohibited,
or in any way restricted, from sending to or receiving from the Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service information regarding the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of an alien
in the United States.”).  Section 1644 applies only to government entities; for this reason, it
does not present as difficult a question as § 1373.
204 Nor should the federal government be understood to have the power under Article
I to create rights in state or local government entities against the state itself (at least absent
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To the extent that that this statute limits how the states can control their
own officials, it probably runs afoul of the anticommandeering doctrine for
the same reasons the California provisions discussed above are not pre-
empted.  It is not a regulation of private conduct, nor a grant of a right to a
private person.
But this conclusion is less clear, because the statute could be read as
creating a federal right in the state official as an individual to communicate
with the federal government.  And surely the federal government can create
rights in state employees as individuals against their employers.  Everything
from minimum wage laws to whistleblower laws fit that description.  If so con-
strued, the prohibition on states limiting their employees’ ability to commu-
nicate with the federal government might be seen as a constitutionally
permissible creation of a right in a private person and preempt contrary state
law.
There are two reasons that counsel against this reading, one statutory,
the other constitutional.  As a statutory matter, it does not appear to be the
best reading of the statute: a state official is given no right of action (express
the state’s consent), for that would give the federal government the power to reorganize a
state government.  From the perspective of the United States Constitution, state and local
government entities are simply creatures of the state, with no rights against their creator.
See City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923).  As noted above, the result may
be different where congressional powers to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments are
involved.  So, too, the result might be different where Congress is acting on its obligation
to guarantee that each state have a republican form of government, U.S. CONST. art. IV,
§ 4, or where the Constitution itself confers particular powers on a part of the state govern-
ment. See, e.g., Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922); Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920);
McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
The panel in New York stated that it “is not so obvious” that there is a relevant power
“reserved to the States” regarding immigration.  New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 951 F.3d
84, 113 (2d Cir. 2020).  It did not “pursue the point further because, even assuming some
power reserved for the States to prohibit information sharing with federal immigration
authorities,” it concluded “that § 1373 does not violate the Tenth Amendment as applied
here to a federal funding requirement.” Id. at 114.  Even assuming that federal authority
over immigration is exclusive—but see Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 419 (2012)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part) (observing that in the early years after the founding, the
debate was “whether, under the Constitution, the States had exclusive authority to enact . . .
immigration laws” (emphasis altered)) —“the relevant power reserved to the states in this
situation is not the power to enact immigration-related legislation.  Rather, the reserved
power at issue is the authority of the states to refuse the aid of state officials in enforcing
federal law,” New York, 964 F.3d at 165–66 (Pooler, J., dissenting) (denying rehearing en
banc), or simply to set the priorities of its own law enforcement personnel.  The anticom-
mandeering principle does not evaporate in the face of an exclusive federal power; if any-
thing, the exclusive nature of a federal power is an additional reason to forbid
commandeering.  Surely Congress could not (say) order the states to issue letters of mar-
que and reprisal. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power to . . . grant
Letters of Marque and Reprisal”); id. § 10 (“No State shall . . . grant Letters of Marque and
Reprisal.”).
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or implied)205 against the government employer to vindicate that right.  Nor
is there the sort of rights-creating language that would give rise to a claim
under § 1983.206  In addition, since public officials would typically be dis-
charged without a judicial process, it is not the kind of right that one would
expect to be vindicated by way of defense to some state enforcement action.
As a constitutional matter, the statute does not apply to private employees—
so Congress is not “evenhandedly regulat[ing] an activity in which both
States and private actors engage.”207
205 See generally Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441
U.S. 677 (1979).
206 See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002) (“We now reject the notion that
our cases permit anything short of an unambiguously conferred right to support a cause of
action brought under § 1983.”).
207 Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1478 (2018); see also New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160 (1992) (distinguishing Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), as dealing with the “authority of Congress to
subject state governments to generally applicable laws”).
Peter Margulies argues, “While § 1373 does not expressly bar states from restricting
private individuals’ sharing of immigration status information with federal officials, state
attempts at such restrictions would clash with both the INA and the First Amendment,”
and therefore that it “merely clarifies that prohibitions on state interference with private
individuals’ sharing of information with the federal government also apply to state interfer-
ence with sub-federal officials’ information-sharing.”  Peter Margulies, Deconstructing “Sanc-
tuary Cities”: The Legality of Federal Grant Conditions That Require State and Local Cooperation on
Immigration Enforcement, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1507, 1560 n.258 (2018).  He does not
elaborate, other than to refer to obstacle preemption and cite Arizona v. United States, 567
U.S. 387 (2012).  Although Margulies does not mention it, a state law restriction on private
persons communicating with the federal government might well violate the privileges or
immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment:
But lest it should be said that no such privileges and immunities are to be found if
those we have been considering are excluded, we venture to suggest some which
own their existence to the Federal government, its National character, its Consti-
tution, or its laws.
One of these is well described in the case of Crandall v. Nevada.  It is said to
be the right of the citizen of this great country, protected by implied guarantees
of its Constitution, “to come to the seat of government to assert any claim he may
have upon that government, to transact any business he may have with it, to seek
its protection, to share its offices, to engage in administering its functions.”
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (21 Wall.) 36, 79 (1872) (quoting Crandall v. Nevada, 73
U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 44 (1867)).  But even if there is such a federal right created by some
federal law other than § 1373, it is hard to see § 1373 as “evenhanded” regulation of both
state and private actors.
Determining whether there is evenhanded regulation of both states and private actors
is probably also the best way to approach the question of compulsory sharing of informa-
tion more generally. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918 (1997) (declining to
address statutes that “require only the provision of information to the Federal Govern-
ment”); id. at 936 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that “the Court appropriately
refrains from deciding whether other purely ministerial reporting requirements imposed
by Congress on state and local authorities . . . are similarly invalid”).  “ ‘For more than three
centuries it has now been recognized as a fundamental maxim that the public . . . has a
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Thus, the best conclusion is that the statute is unconstitutional, but a
similar result could be achieved, if Congress so chose, by granting employees
more generally (state as well as private) a right to communicate with immi-
gration authorities despite the objections of their employers and giving them
a right of action against their employers if they suffer adverse action for such
communication.
State Convictions As Predicates.  On the other hand, nothing in the
anticommandeering doctrine empowers states to veto deportations that are
based on state-court convictions, contrary to the argument in a recent
Harvard Law Review note.208  Deportations can be triggered by certain state
court convictions,209 but federal law reliance on state law is ubiquitous, rang-
ing across not only immigration law,210 but tax law,211 social security bene-
fits,212 the law of judgments,213 civil procedure,214 assimilative crimes,215
sentencing,216 and bankruptcy217—to name a few.
More generally, as Henry Hart and Herbert Wechsler put it in 1953:
Federal law is generally interstitial in its nature.  It rarely occupies a legal
field completely, totally excluding all participation by the legal systems of the
states.  This was plainly true in the beginning when the federal legislative
product (including the Constitution) was extremely small.  It is significantly
true today, despite the volume of Congressional enactments, and even
within areas where Congress has been very active.  Federal legislation, on the
whole, has been conceived and drafted on an ad hoc basis to accomplish
right to every man’s evidence.’”  United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (quoting
8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2192). See also Trump v. Vance, 140 S.
Ct. 2412 (2020) (“In our judicial system, ‘the public has a right to every man’s evidence.’
Since the earliest days of the Republic, ‘every man’ has included the President of the
United States.” (footnote omitted)).
208 States’ Commandeered Convictions, supra note 19, at 2327.
209 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2018).
210 See, e.g., Howard F. Chang, Public Benefits and Federal Authorization for Alienage Discrim-
ination by the States, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 357, 360 (2002) (“For a marriage to serve
as the basis for an immigration visa, for example, the marriage must be valid under state
law.”).
211 See Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 52 (1999) (“The Internal Revenue Code’s
prescriptions are most sensibly read to look to state law for delineation of the taxpayer’s
rights or interests, but to leave to federal law the determination whether those rights or
interests constitute ‘property’ or ‘rights to property’ within the meaning of § 6321.”).
212 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(d) (2018) (providing that, with certain exceptions, “[i]n deter-
mining whether two individuals are husband and wife for purposes of this subchapter,
appropriate State law shall be applied”).
213 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2018).
214 E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e), 4(k).
215 18 U.S.C. § 13 (2018).
216 Id. § 924.
217 Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443, 450–51
(2007) (“Indeed, we have long recognized that the ‘“basic federal rule” in bankruptcy is
that state law governs the substance of claims, Congress having “generally left the determi-
nation of property rights in the assets of a bankrupt’s estate to state law.”’” (quoting
Raleigh v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 20 (2000))).
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limited objectives.  It builds upon legal relationships established by the
states, altering or supplanting them only so far as necessary for the special
purpose.  Congress acts, in short, against the background of the total corpus
juris of the states in much the way that a state legislature acts against the
background of the common law, assumed to govern unless changed by
legislation.218
While this description is less accurate today than in 1953, there is noth-
ing unconstitutional about this longstanding and traditional approach to the
relation between state and federal law.  Federal law can “build upon the legal
relationships established by the states.”  Where federal law builds on the legal
relationships established by state law, some states may disagree with that fed-
eral law. But disagreement with what federal law does to private individuals—
without coercion of any sort against the states or their officials—is not
commandeering.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has clarified the distinction between permissible
preemption and unconstitutional commandeering doctrine.  In doing so, it
rejected the conventional, but deeply unsatisfying, distinction between Con-
gress telling the states what they couldn’t do and Congress telling the states
what they had to do.
Instead, preemption involves Congress enacting a law that imposes
restrictions or confers rights on private actors.  If a state law confers rights or
imposes restrictions that conflict with the federal law, the federal law takes
precedence and the state law is preempted.  On the other hand, if the federal
law cannot be understood as imposing restrictions or conferring rights on
private actors but is merely a direct command to the states, it is unconstitu-
tional commandeering.  So conceptualized, the anticommandeering doc-
trine is now broadly accepted on the Supreme Court.
While the anticommandeering doctrine does not pose a threat to as
many federal laws as some have suggested, it should constrain some actions
that are currently attempted by the federal government, particularly regard-
ing immigration.  And more importantly, as an important element of our
federalism, it now stands as a stronger legal bulwark against the possibility of
tyranny.
218 RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO,
HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 488–89 (7th ed. 2015)
(reprinting a passage from the first edition in 1953).
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